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NOTES
NOT JUST FOR WIDOWS & ORPHANS ANYMORE: THE
INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT SUITABILITY
RULES FOR THE DERIVATIVES MARKET
JENNIFER A. FREDERICK
INTRODUCTION
A senior associate at a New York City law firm specializing in secur-
ities litigation met with three new clients in the early part of 1995.
John Middlemanager ("Middlemanager"), a marketing executive
earning a modest income, was the first new client.' Middlemanager
informed the attorney that he lost $3500 through option contracts2
purchased at the recommendation of Robert Richbroker ("Rich-
broker"), a registered representative 3 employed by Stockseller Invest-
ments ("Stockseller").4 The marketing executive provided as his
1. The characters introduced in the Introduction and discussed throughout this
Note are fictional persons created by the author to illustrate issues addressed in the
Note.
2. An option contract affords its owner the right to buy or sell an asset at a pre-
determined price on or before a specified date. Stephen A. Ross et al., Corporate
Finance 611 (3d ed. 1993). A call option gives the option holder the right to buy, and
a put option gives the holder the right to sell, the underlying asset. John C. Hull,
Introduction to Futures & Options Markets 4 (2d ed. 1995). The price paid for an
option contract is referred to as the "premium." Pass Trak Series 7 Principles & Prac-
tices: General Securities Representative 358 (6th ed. 1991) [hereinafter Pass Trak].
The price at which the asset can be purchased by the option holder is the "strike
price" or "exercise price." Hull, supra, at 4. The date on or before which the option
must be exercised is the "expiration date." See id For example, an IBM call option
with a strike price of $50 and an expiration date of September 28, 1995 gives the
option holder the right to purchase IBM stock for $50 per share on or before Septem-
ber 28, 1995.
This Note does not attempt to provide the reader with a detailed analysis of options
trading. For a thorough discussion of option contracts and their uses, see Hull, supra,
at 172-408; Pass Trak, supra, at 357-409; Ross, supra, at 611-45.
3. The term "registered representative" includes any person associated with a
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") member firm. See Pass
Trak, supra note 2, at 291; see also NASD Manual (CCH) I 1101(m) (1995) (defining
an NASD member firm as "any broker or dealer admitted to membership in the
[NASD]"); Id. 'I 1101(q) (defining a person associated with an NASD member firm as
"[any] sole proprietor, partner, officer, director, or branch manager of any member,
or any natural person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, or
any natural person engaged in the investment banking or securities business who is
directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by such member").
4. Stockseller is a securities broker and dealer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1994)
(defining "broker" as "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions
in securities for the accounts of others, but [not including] a bank"); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(5) (1994) (defining "dealer" as "any person engaged in the business of buy-
ing and selling securities for his own account... but [not including] a bank"). Stock-
seller is a member of the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). The
NASD is a national securities association registered with the Securities and Exchange
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reason for contacting a lawyer the recovery of the $3500 from Rich-
broker and Stockseller.
The second new client was Larry Leisure ("Leisure"), a sixty-seven
year old retired college professor. In his meeting with the lawyer, Lei-
sure explained how, three months earlier, he entered into a long posi-
tion in gold futures5 at the recommendation of Faith Futuresdealer
("Futuresdealer"), a futures commission merchant 6 employed by
Commodityco, Incorporated ("Commodityco").7 Unfortunately, the
value of Leisure's futures position decreased by $31,000 because of
falling gold prices. Leisure contacted the law firm to inquire about the
possibility of receiving compensation for his losses.
Producestuff, Incorporated ("Producestuff"), a medium-sized man-
ufacturing company, was the law firm's third new client. Frank
Financeman ("Financeman"), the manager of Producestuff's finance
department, met with the senior associate and explained that, in early
Commission ("SEC"). See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a)-(b) (1994) (providing for the registra-
tion of national securities associations); In re National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 5
SEC 627, 633 (1939) (granting the NASD status as a registered national securities
association). The NYSE is a registered national securities exchange. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f(a)-(b) (1994) (providing for the registration of national securities exchanges). A
NYSE "member" includes any person permitted to effect transactions on the floor of
the NYSE and any registered broker-dealer with which that person is associated. See
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(3)(A) (1994) (defining "member" with respect to national securi-
ties exchanges).
5. A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell an asset for a specified price
at a predetermined time in the future. Hull, supra note 2, at 1. The party who agrees
to buy the asset in the future has a long futures position, id. at 2, and the party who
agrees to sell the asset has a short futures position. Id. The price at which the asset
will be bought or sold is referred to as the "futures price," see id., and the time at
which the exchange will take place is the "delivery month." See id. at 21.
For example, if an investor enters into a short position in one soybean contract on
the Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT") with a futures price of $500 (for 5000 bushels)
and a delivery month of June, the investor is obligated to sell 5000 bushels of soy-
beans for $500 in the month of June. In reality, very few futures contracts lead to
actual delivery of the underlying asset. Id. at 17. Instead, most investors close out
their futures positions prior to delivery by entering into a trade opposite to the origi-
nal contract. Id. at 17-18.
This Note does not attempt to provide a comprehensive discussion of the futures
markets. For a thorough analysis of futures trading, see id. at 17-141.
6. A "futures commission merchant" is defined as any "individual, association,
partnership, corporation, or trust ... engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for
the purchase or sale" of futures contracts. 7 U.S.C. § la(12) (1994).
7. Commodityco is a futures commission merchant and a member of the CBOT.
The CBOT is a board of trade designated as a contract market by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). See 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii) (1994) (authorizing the
CFTC to designate boards of trade as contract markets for the trading of futures
contracts); see also 7 U.S.C. § la(15) (1994) (defining "member of a contract market"
as "an individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust owning or holding
membership in, or admitted to membership representation on, a contract market or
given members' trading privileges thereon"); Hull, supra note 2, at 19 tbl. 2.1 (listing
domestic contract markets upon which futures contracts are traded).
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1994, Producestuff entered into an interest rate swap agreement8 with
nationally chartered Moneylender Bank, Incorporated ("Money-
lender") at Moneylender's recommendation. Unexpected interest
rate fluctuations forced Producestuff to make a substantial payment to
Moneylender under the swap agreement. Financeman, worried that
large future payments might force Producestuff into bankruptcy,
asked the attorney if Producestuff could rescind the swap agreement
and recover a portion of the previous payment.
Although Middlemanager's, Leisure's, and Producestuff's circum-
stances are not identical, two common themes characterize their ex-
periences. First, the financial products recommended by Richbroker,
Futuresdealer, and Moneylender are all derivative instruments. A
"derivative" is generally defined as a contract or security whose value
depends on the future price of an underlying asset or assets.9 The
products recommended to Middlemanager, Leisure, and Producestuff
do not encompass every type of derivative; they do, however, repre-
sent the three most common categories-options, futures, and swaps.
Options and futures have long histories in the investment commu-
8. A swap agreement is a "private agreement[ ] between two [entities] to ex-
change cash flows in the future according to a prearranged formula." Hull, supra note
2, at 146. An interest rate swap is a swap agreement under which one party makes
payments equal to interest at a predetermined fixed rate on a notional principal and
the other party makes payments equal to interest at a floating rate on the same no-
tional amount. Id. The interest rates specified in the swap agreement are often based
upon interest rates on treasury securities. See id. at 153. Payments made pursuant to a
swap agreement occur at regular intervals, generally every six months. Id. The actual
payments made represent the difference between the two promised payments; the
notional principal is never exchanged. Id. at 151. The duration of swap agreements is
fixed by the parties and usually ranges from two to over 15 years. Id. at 146.
For example, suppose that, on January 6, 1995, parties A and B enter into a swap
agreement under which party A agrees to pay party B payments based on a 10% fixed
rate of interest and a $1,000,000 notional amount. Party B agrees to pay party A
payments based on a floating rate equal to the current three-month treasury bill ("T-
bill") rate plus 4%, based on the same notional amount. The parties agree that pay-
ments will be made every twelve months. If on July 6 the T-bill rate is 5.50%, party A
will pay party B $5,000. The $5,000 represents the difference between party A's
promised payment of $100,000 and party B's promised payment of $95,000. See id. at
147-53.
Another popular type of swap is a currency swap. Under a typical currency swap
agreement, the parties exchange principal and interest payments on a loan in one
currency for principal and interest on a similar loan in a different currency. See id. at
159. In addition to interest rate and currency swaps, there exist several other varieties
of swaps. See id. at 165. For a thorough discussion of the rapidly expanding swap
market, see id. at 146-68.
9. Bernard J. Karol & Mary B. Lehman, Equity Derivatives, 27 Rev. Sec. & Com-
modities Reg. 121, 121 (1994). The assets underlying Middlemanager's option con-
tracts are shares of stock. Gold underlies Leisure's futures position and treasury
instruments underlie the Moneylender/Producestuff interest rate swap agreement.
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nity.' ° Swaps, on the other hand, are relatively novel financial
instruments."
Derivatives, the majority of which a few decades ago were "an ob-
scure backwater of the securities business,"' 2 are the investment craze
of the 1990s. Approximately seventy-five percent of America's largest
companies currently utilize derivatives, 3 and broker-dealers 4 are re-
alizing sizeable profits from structuring derivatives transactions for
their customers.' 5
Presently, however, both consumers and dealers of derivatives are
realizing that these new products are not fail-safe. The Procter &
Gamble Company ("P&G"), for example, lost over $150 million (pre-
tax) in 1994 as a result of the company's derivatives activity.16 The
ramifications of derivatives-related losses suffered by P&G and other
10. Option contracts originated during the seventeenth century. Stephen A. Red-
lick, Evolution of the Options Business, in An Empirical Examination of the Options
Market 1, 1 (Paul Saroff ed., 1977). The first organized domestic market for options
trading, the Chicago Board Options Exchange ("CBOE"), was established in 1973.
Id. at 21. Organized futures trading also began in the United States during the 1600s.
Richard J. Teweles & Frank J. Jones, The Futures Game: Who Wins? Who Loses?
Why? 8 (2d ed. 1987). The first formalized futures market, the CBOT, was estab-
lished in 1848. Id. at 9.
11. The market for swaps did not begin to develop until the early 1980s. Clifford
W. Smith, Jr. et al., The Evolving Market for Swaps, in The Handbook of Currency
and Interest Rate Risk Management 6-1, 6-10 (Robert J. Schwartz & Clifford W.
Smith, Jr. eds., 1990); see also Richard W. Jennings et al., Securities Regulation 16
n.48 (7th ed. 1992) (noting that "[a]lthough new, the size of the swaps market dwarfs
many other financial markets").
12. Robert Lenzner & William Heuslein, The Age of Digital Capitalism, Forbes,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 62, 63.
13. Kelley Holland, Did Procter & Gamble Play With Fire?, Bus. Wk., Apr. 25,
1994, at 38, 38. For example, U.S. West hedges its exposure to exchange rate fluctua-
tions with foreign currency options, Rita Koselka, Safe When Used Properly, Forbes,
Aug. 15, 1994, at 47, 48, and McDonald's Corporation uses interest rate swaps to
lower its borrowing costs. Lenzner & Heuslein, supra note 12, at 65.
14. For purposes of this Note, brokers and dealers will be referred to collectively
as broker-dealers.
15. For example, $400 million of Goldman, Sachs' 1992 trading profits came from
its derivatives business. Lenzner & Heuslein, supra note 12, at 63. Similarly, nearly a
third of Bankers Trust's 1993 net income came from derivatives. Kelley Holland, De-
rivatives: Alive, But Oh So Boring, Bus. Wk., Jan. 30, 1995, at 76, 76 [hereinafter
Holland, Derivatives].
16. Koselka, supra note 13, at 47. The after-tax loss to P&G is estimated at
slightly above $100 million. G. Bruce Knecht, The Lawyers' Turn: Derivatives Are
Going Through Crucial Test: A Wave of Lawsuits, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1994, at Al.
Another large company, Gibson Greetings, Incorporated ("Gibson") suffered deriva-
tives-related losses of approximately $20 million in 1994. Id. Corporations are not the
only entities hit by losses arising out of investments in derivatives. On December 6,
1994, Orange County, California filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy after losing $1.5 bil-
lion from speculating in derivatives. Jeff Brown, Exotic Gamblers: Orange County's
Woes Prompt Rush to Regulate Municipal Investments, Pitt. Post-Gazette, Dec. 9,
1994, at C-8; see also Jim Clarke, 7 S.C. Counties May Have Lost Money in Risky
Securities, Charlotte Observer, Jan. 28, 1995, at 1C (discussing losses suffered by sev-
eral municipalities as a result of derivatives use).
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end-users are also impacting the dealers. On October 27, 1994, P&G
filed suit against Bankers Trust, one of the largest domestic derivatives
dealers, seeking to recover losses resulting from a swap agreement
recommended by Bankers Trust. 7 P&G's highly publicized losses, as
well as those of other derivatives consumers, have frightened many
companies away from all but the safest derivatives.' 8 As a result,
dealers' profits from derivatives sales have fallen significantly. 19
In addition to all falling within the definition of derivative, the fi-
nancial instruments recommended by Richbroker, Futuresdealer, and
Moneylender may not have been "suitable" for Middlemanager, Lei-
sure, and Producestuff. The general principle of suitability implies
that a financial advisor' must refrain from recommending an invest-
ment to a customer unless the advisor believes the investment is ap-
propriate in light of the customer's current financial situation and
objectives.2' Suitability rules transform the concept of suitability into
a legal obligation imposed on financial advisors. If governed by such
rules, an advisor must obtain information regarding a customer's fi-
nancial status,2 investment objectives,' and capacity to absorb mone-
tary losses' prior to recommending a plan of investment3 5 The
financial advisor violates any applicable suitability rules if he recom-
17. Complaint, Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. C-1-94-735 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 27, 1994). The P&G case is still pending. Gibson also sued Bankers Trust
to recover losses resulting from derivatives sold to the company by the bank. Com-
plaint, Gibson Greetings, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. C-1-94-620 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
12, 1994). The parties in Gibson settled with Bankers Trust agreeing to pay a S10
million civil penalty to the SEC and the CFIC. See Lee S. Richards & Arthur S.
Greenspan, Suitability Issues in Derivatives Trading, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 22, 1995, at 1, 4;
Dominic Bencivenga, A 'Suitable' Investment Derivatives Groups Devise Voluntary
Standards, N.Y. L.., Sept. 7, 1995, at 5, 5.
18. Holland, Derivatives, supra note 15, at 76-77.
19. Id. at 76. Bankers Trust's income from derivatives activity fell sharply in the
second quarter of 1994. Id. Also in 1994, J.P. Morgan's derivatives trading revenue
fell 17%, Citibank's revenue from derivatives transactions dropped 50% in the first
nine months, and Chase Manhattan Corporation suffered a $20 million loss on several
derivatives contracts in the fourth quarter. Id.
20. For purposes of this Note, the term "financial advisor" includes registered rep-
resentatives, broker-dealers, futures commission merchants, and banks that engage in
investment counseling.
21. See generally Gerald L. Fishman, Broker-Dealer Obligations to Customers-
The NASD Suitability Rule, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 233 (1966) (discussing suitability in the
context of securities transactions); Walter C. Greenough, The Limits of the Suitability
Doctrine in Commodity Futures Trading, 47 Bus. Law. 991 (1992) (discussing suitabil-
ity in the context of futures trading).
22. This type of information includes the customer's annual income, net worth, tax
bracket, and other similar data. See Pass Trak, supra note 2, at 246-47.
23. Possible investment objectives include preservation of principal, fixed income,
moderate growth, and speculation. See id. at 248-49.
24. A customer's capacity to absorb monetary losses depends on factors such as
his debt obligations and the number of dependents for whom he provides financial
support. See id. at 247.
25. See Greenough, supra note 21, at 992-93.
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mends investments that are inconsistent with the customer's financial
profile.26
Suitability rules serve to protect investors from the self-interested
actions of unscrupulous financial advisors.27 These rules are often
necessary because disclosure of the risks inherent in a recommended
investment may not adequately protect a customer with little knowl-
edge of the financial product.2 Suitability rules are important in the
context of derivatives because of the risk involved in these complex
financial instruments. Even large corporations, generally considered
"sophisticated investors," may not fully understand2 9 the complicated
terms contained in a derivatives contract. 30 Furthermore, in the deriv-
atives market, the dealer generally has knowledge and experience far
superior to that of the customer.31 Thus, suitability rules should im-
pose a legal duty on derivatives dealers to recommend only suitable
derivatives transactions.
Suitability rules, however, should not place overly burdensome du-
ties on financial advisors or expose such advisors to "randomly im-
posed liability" based on undefined standards.32 Nor should
suitability rules eradicate a customer's freedom to make his own in-
vestment decisions.33 Finally, suitability rules should not be a litiga-
tion tool in the hands of customers who are simply disappointed with
the outcome of their investment decisions. 4
The complexity and riskiness of the derivatives recommended to
Middlemanager, Leisure, and Producestuff and the superior knowl-
edge possessed by Richbroker, Futuresdealer, and Moneylender indi-
cate that the three clients should recover under suitability rules.
Moreover, the inclusion of options, futures, and swaps in the defini-
tion of derivative demonstrates that similar suitability rules should
govern the hypothetical transactions. Under currently applicable laws,
rules, and regulations, however, the injured customers are not entitled
26. See Richard M. Baker & Gregory K. Lawrence, Actions Against Broker-Deal-
ers for the Sale of Unsuitable Securities, 13 Stetson L. Rev. 283, 283 (1984).
27. Fishman, supra note 21, at 233.
28. Id. at 240. But see Greenough, supra note 21, at 1007 (asserting that disclosure
and other customer protection doctrines protect investors from "overreaching" by fi-
nancial advisors).
29. Actually, corportions do not "understand" anything. The financial profession-
als employed by corporations cause these entities to be classified as sophisticated.
30. See Peter Blackman, Dealing in Derivatives: Is a "Sophisticated" Investor a
"Suitable" One?, N.Y. LJ., May 12, 1994, at 5, 5; see also Greenough, supra note 21,
at 992 (recognizing that certain investments may not be suitable for sophisticated
investors).
31. Blackman, supra note 30, at 5.
32. Greenough, supra note 21, at 1006.
33. Id. at 1007. Additionally, prohibiting dealers from recommending only suita-
ble derivatives transactions may exclude all but institutional investors and wealthy
individuals from the derivatives market. This paternalistic approach is inconsistent
with the disclosure-based nature of the federal securities laws.
34. See Fishman, supra note 21, at 248.
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to recovery and the legal analysis differs significantly for each of the
recommended financial products.
Middlemanager's stock options are considered "securities" under
the federal securities laws.35 Thus, Richbroker's recommendation is
governed by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and
self-regulatory organizations 36 ("SROs") such as the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") and the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE"). 37 These SROs have suitability rules that impose
a legal duty on registered representatives to ensure that the invest-
ments they recommend are suitable for their customers.38 While reg-
istered representatives who violate the SRO suitability rules may be
subject to disciplinary sanctions, the rules do not provide a private
cause of action for customers injured by unsuitable
recommendations.39
Injured securities customers can attempt to recover under a section
10(b) cause of action based on unsuitability. A section 10(b) unsuita-
bility claim, however, is difficult to establish.1° Thus, the existing reg-
ulatory framework does not adequately protect customers from
unsuitable options transactions.
Leisure's gold futures are regulated exclusively by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") pursuant to the Commodity
Exchange Act ("CEA").4 1 The CFTC previously considered, but de-
clined to adopt, a suitability rule; thus, no suitability rules currently
govern the recommendation of futures contracts. 42 Additionally, the
CFTC has stated that the antifraud provisions contained in the CEA
do not impose a legal suitability obligation on futures professionals. 43
Thus, the public is not even minimally protected from unsuitable fu-
tures transactions.
35. The inclusion of options within the definitions of "security" contained in the
Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934
Act") is discussed infra at notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
36. The term "self-regulatory organization" includes "any national securities ex-
change, registered securities association, or registered clearing agency .... " 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(26) (1994).
37. The jurisdiction of the SEC and SROs is discussed infra at notes 69-71 and
accompanying text.
38. The SRO suitability rules are discussed infra at notes 73-101 and accompany-
ing text.
39. The absence of a private cause of action under the NASD and exchange suita-
bility rules is discussed infra at note 103 and accompanying text.
40. The difficulty investors face in establishing section 10(b) liability based solely
on unsuitability is discussed infra at notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
41. The jurisdiction of the CFTC is discussed infra at notes 120-21 and accompa-
nying text.
42. The CFTC's decision not to adopt a suitability rule is discussed infra at notes
136-42 and accompanying text.
43. The CFTC's decision not to consider the recommendation of unsuitable in-
vestments as a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") antifraud rules is
discussed infra at notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
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The regulatory framework governing Producestuff 's interest rate
swap is not as well-defined as that governing options and futures.
Producestuff could argue that the interest rate swap is a "security" as
defined by federal securities laws. If this argument succeeded, Mon-
eylender would potentially be subject to SRO disciplinary sanctions."
Swaps, however, do not fit readily into any of the categories of secur-
ity contained in the federal securities laws.45
Moneylender, on the other hand, could contend that the interest
rate swap is analogous to a futures contract and thus falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC.46 Because the CFTC does not
have a suitability rule, Moneylender would have had no duty to deter-
mine whether the interest rate swap was suitable for Producestuff if
the swap was considered a futures contract. The CFTC, however, ex-
empts the majority of swaps from its regulation.4 7
Finally, because Moneylender is a national bank subject to over-
sight by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), any
applicable OCC rules would be relevant in analyzing a claim brought
by Producestuff against the bank.48 The OCC, however, does not im-
pose on banks subject to its jurisdiction a legal duty to recommend
only suitable investments. 49
This Note addresses suitability in the context of derivatives. 50 Part I
discusses suitability with respect to options and futures. This part first
outlines the existing SRO suitability rules governing options transac-
tions and analyzes the application of these rules. Part I then considers
unsuitability as a basis for a section 10(b) cause of action. Finally, part
I looks at the CFTC's past and current view on the duty to determine
suitability when recommending futures transactions.
Part II considers suitability with respect to swap transactions. This
part begins by looking at whether swaps can be classified as either
"securities" or "futures," thus subjecting swaps to jurisdiction under
the federal securities laws or CFTC rules, respectively. Additionally,
44. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. Producestuff would not, how-
ever, have a private cause of action against Moneylender. See supra note 103 and
accompanying text.
45. Classification of swaps as securities is considered infra at Part II.B.
46. Classification of swaps as futures is considered infra at notes 188-98 and ac-
companying text.
47. The CFTC's decision not to include most swaps within its jurisdiction is dis-
cussed infra at notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
48. Regulation of banks is discussed infra at notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
49. The OCC's decision not to regulate suitability is discussed infra at notes 215-
23 and accompanying text.
50. This Note discusses the regulation of derivatives only with respect to the do-
mestic derivatives market. For a thorough discussion of derivatives in the interna-
tional arena, see Thomas C. Singher, Regulating Derivatives: Does Transnational
Regulatory Cooperation Offer a Viable Alternative to Congressional Action, 18 Ford-
ham Int'l L.J. 1397 (1995).
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part II looks at the potentially relevant federal banking regulations
governing swap transactions.
Part EEI of this Note explores the adoption of a suitability rule that
would govern all types of derivatives. This part first considers policy
arguments for and against adopting such a rule, and then discusses
legislation pending in the House of Representatives that would allow
for the promulgation and enforcement of a derivatives suitability rule.
Finally, part III proposes a model rule and applies it to the situations
of Middlemanager, Leisure, and Producestuff. This Note concludes
that Congress should enact the pending legislation. It also concludes
that the appropriate agencies should promulgate the model rule
thereunder.
I. OriONS AND FUTURES
Options and futures are similar in many respects. As mentioned
previously, both financial products are considered derivatives because
their values depend on the future prices of underlying assets 51 Addi-
tionally, both types of contracts involve the future purchase or sale of
an asset for a predetermined price.5 Furthermore, investors use op-
tions and futures for similar purposes.53 Finally, and most importantly
for purposes of this Note, both options and futures involve a high level
of risk and the potential for substantial losses.-'
Despite the similarities between options and futures, entirely differ-
ent regulatory frameworks govern the two types of financial instru-
ments.55 Options fall within the jurisdiciton of the SEC and various
SROs,16 while futures are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
CFTC.' Thus, options and futures transactions are not subject to the
same suitability rules.
This part analyzes the distinct bodies of law that govern the options
and futures markets, focusing on suitability. Section A discusses the
regulation of options contracts and section B discusses the regulation
of futures contracts. This part demonstrates that neither regulatory
framework adequately protects customers from unsuitable
investments.
51. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 2, 5 and accompanying text. Options and futures differ, how-
ever, in that an option holder has the right to buy or sell the underlying asset and a
party to a futures contract is obligated to buy or sell the asset. Hull, supra note 2, at 4.
53. Investors use both options and futures for hedging-taking a position in two
or more securities that are negatively correlated to reduce risk, speculation-taking a
position in the market to increase risk exposure, and arbitrage-locking in a riskless
profit by simultaneously entering into transactions in two or more markets. See id. at
6-12.
54. See infra notes 83, 130, 131 and accompanying text.
55. See Jennings, supra note 11, at 15.
56. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text




This section examines the body of law that governs options transac-
tions similar to Middlemanager's investment. This section first ex-
pands the description of the Richbroker/Middlemanager transaction
to illustrate pertinent issues. It then outlines the NASD and SRO
rules that govern options transactions and demonstrates their applica-
tion utilizing the Richbroker/Middlemanager transaction. Addition-
ally, this section considers the recommendation of an unsuitable
securities investment as a violation of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act")5" and Rule 10b-559 thereunder.
This section concludes that the rules governing options trading do not
provide customers injured by unsuitable options transactions with an
adequate remedy.
1. The Richbroker/Middlemanager Options Transaction 60
Middlemanager is forty-five years old, married, and along with his
wife is responsible for the support of two teenage children. Mid-
dlemanager decided to meet with Richbroker to discuss possible strat-
egies for accumulating funds to finance his children's college
educations. Middlemanager did not believe his current investments,
including $4000 in a bond mutual fund, a $10,000 certificate of deposit
maturing in two months, and $23,000 in a savings account, were earn-
ing an adequate rate of return.
At the completion of his initial consultation with Richbroker, Mid-
dlemanager decided to open a nondiscretionary account 6' with Stock-
seller. Middlemanager completed a new account application that
requested information regarding his current financial status and in-
vestment objectives.62 On the form, Middlemanager listed his current
annual salary as $65,000 and his current net worth as $150,000. In
conversation with Richbroker, Middlemanager mentioned that he
might receive an inheritance at some point in the future. The amount
and anticipated receipt date of the inheritance, however, were not dis-
cussed, and Middlemanager did not note the inheritance on his new
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
60. The hypothetical options transaction is not based on a particular case but was
designed to illustrate issues highlighted in various materials.
61. A nondiscretionary account is an account for which the customer, not the reg-
istered representative, makes the final investment decisions. Cf. Pass Trak, supra note
2, at 157 (defining a discretionary account as an account for which the customer au-
thorizes the registered representative to make investment decisions).
62. The new account application also contained a clause stating that any contro-
versy arising out of Middemanager's account must be settled by arbitration in accord-
ance with NASD and NYSE rules. The majority of large brokerage firms include
similar pre-dispute arbitration agreements in their new account agreements. New
York Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration in the Securities Industry: Pre-
Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1511, 1513 (1995).
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account application. Middlemanager did state on the application that
his investment objectives were preservation of principal and long-term
growth.
At Middlemanager's second meeting with Richbroker, the regis-
tered representative suggested that Middlemanager invest in options
to increase his rate of return. Middlemanager informed Richbroker
that he was unfamiliar with the options market. Richbroker briefly
outlined the mechanics of options trading, stressing the ability to accu-
mulate funds quickly through investing in options. Middlemanager,
anxious to begin earning money for his children's education, agreed to
purchase options for his account.
Richbroker recommended that Middlemanager purchase ten over-
the-counter Bigcompany, Incorporated ("Bigcompany") call option
contracts. The options had a strike price of seventy-five, an expiration
date four months in the future, and apremium of three and one-half.6
Richbroker informed Middlemanager that he believed the price of
Bigcompany stock, then at $74 dollars per share, would rise signifi-
cantly in the next four months, thus increasing the value of the
Bigcompany calls. 64 Middlemanager transferred $3500 from his sav-
ings account to his Stockseller account and purchased the Bigcompany
calls. 65
Unfortunately, the direction of the price of Bigcompany stock did
not rise in accordance with Richbroker's predictions and instead fell
to $65 dollars per share over the next four months. Thus, when Mid-
dlemanager's call options expired, they were worthless.66 Upset about
his $3500 loss, Middlemanager contacted a lawyer.
2. Jurisdiction and Applicable Suitability Rules
The Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") and the 1934 Act, as
amended, include option contracts in their definitions of "security."'67
63. For a discussion of the terminology used in options trading, see supra note 2.
64. Call options become more valuable as the price of the underlying stock in-
creases. Hull, supra note 2, at 198.
65. Each option contract provides a right to buy (call) or sell (put) 100 units of the
underlying asset. See Pass Trak, supra note 2, at 358. The premium quoted applies to
each individual unit. See id. Thus, the $3500 price paid by Middlemanager for the
Bigcompany calls is calculated by multiplying the number of options contracts, ten,
and the premium, three and one-half, by 100.
66. The Bigcompany calls expired worthless because there is no reason to exercise
a right to purchase Bigcompany stock for 75 dollars per share when it is selling in the
marketplace for 65 dollars per share. See Hull, supra note 2, at 173.
67. The definition of "security" under the 1933 Act is as follows:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas,
or other mineral rights, any pu4 call, straddle option, or privilege on any
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any
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Moreover, courts have long held that options are securities under the
federal securities laws.' The SEC has regulatory jurisdiction over all
securities transactions initiated by broker-dealers.6 9 Accordingly, bro-
ker-dealers recommending or executing transactions in options must
comply with applicable SEC rules. Additionally, a national securities
exchange has jurisdiction over securities transactions executed on that
exchange,70 and the NASD imposes rules governing over-the-counter
trading in securities.7 Thus, in addition to SEC rules, a broker-dealer
recommending options to a customer is subject to exchange or NASD
rules, depending on whether the options are traded on an exchange or
over-the-counter.
The SEC does not currently have a suitability rule.72 Both the
NASD and the major national securities exchanges, however, have
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
The 1934 Act definition of "security" is as follows:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in
any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or
group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on
a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but
shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's
acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding
nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity
of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994) (emphasis added).
68. See One-O-One Enters. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Mix v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 720 F. Supp. 8, 9 (D.D.C. 1989).
69. The SEC was established under 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1994) and derives its
rulemaking power under 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1994) and 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1994).
70. Bright v. Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exch., 327 F. Supp. 495,
501 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (1994) (requiring all brokers and dealers effecting
over-the-counter securities transactions to register with a national securities
association).
72. Prior to 1983, the SEC imposed a legal duty on certain broker-dealers to rec-
ommend only suitable securities transactions. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (repealed
1983). Legislation enacted in December 1983 rescinded the SEC suitability rule and
required broker-dealers that effected over-the-counter transactions to register with a
national securities association. Act of June 6, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-38, § 3, 97 Stat. 205,
206 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780(b)(8) (1994)).
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suitability rules. The following subsections provide a description of
these rules.
a. NASD Suitability Rules
The NASD has both a general suitability rule applicable to all rec-
ommendations of over-the-counter securities transactions ("NASD
general suitability rule"),73 and a specific suitability rule governing
only recommendations of over-the-counter options transactions
("NASD options suitability rule").74 The NASD general suitability
rule allows a registered representative to recommend a securities
transaction to a customer only if he has a reasonable belief that the
transaction is suitable for the customer.75 Additionally, the NASD
73. The full text of the NASD general suitability rule is as foUows:
(a) In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any
security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the rec-
ommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any,
disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his
financial situation and needs.
(b) Prior to the execution of a transaction recommended to a non-institu-
tional customer, other than transactions with customers where investments
are limited to money market mutual funds, a member shall make reasonable
efforts to obtain information concerning.
(i) the customer's financial status;
(ii) the customer's tax status;
(iii) the customer's investment objectives; and
(iv) such other information used or considered to be reasonable and by
such member or registered representative in making recommendations
to the customer.
NASD Manual (CC) 2152, at 2050 (1995).
Additionally, the NASD recently issued an interpretation of its general suitability
rule applicable to recommendations made to institutional customers. NASD Notice to
Members 95-21 (April 1995); see also Richards & Greenspan supra note 17, at 4
(describing in detail the NASD's interpretation of its general suitability rule).
74. The full text of the NASD options suitability rule is as follows:
(A) No member or person associated with a member shall recommend to
any customer any transaction for the purchase or sale (writing) of an option
contract unless such member or person associated therewith has reasonable
grounds to believe upon the basis of information furnished by such customer
after reasonable inquiry by the member or person associated therewith con-
cerning the customer's investment objectives, financial situation and needs,
and any other information known by such member or associated person, that
the recommended transaction is not unsuitable for such customer.
(B) No member or person associated with a member shall recommend to
a customer an opening transaction in any option contract unless the person
making the recommendation has a reasonable basis for believing, at the time
of making the recommendation, that the customer has such knowledge and
experience in financial matters that he may reasonably be expected to be
capable of evaluating the risks of the recommended transaction, and is finan-
cially able to bear the risks of the recommended position in the option
contract.
NASD Manual (CCH) 2183, at 2168 (1995).
75. NASD Manual (CCH) 2152, at 2050 (1995). The NASD suitability rule ap-
plies only to transactions that are recommended by a member broker-dealer. Eileen
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general suitability rule mandates that a registered representative
make reasonable efforts to obtain from the customer information con-
cerning (1) the customer's financial status, (2) the customer's tax sta-
tus, (3) the customer's investment objectives, and (4) any other
relevant information.76 The registered representative must then base
his determination of suitability on this information."
The NASD options suitability rule imposes requirements additional
to those imposed by the general suitability rule. Under the NASD
options suitability rule, a registered representative recommending an
options transaction must, in addition to suggesting only suitable in-
vestments, have a reasonable belief that (1) the customer has the
knowledge and financial experience sufficient to understand the risks
of the recommended options transaction, and (2) the customer is fi-
nancially able to bear the risks of the transaction.78
b. Exchange Suitability Rules
The major national securities exchanges have suitability rules that
are similar or identical to the NASD general and options suitability
rules.79 For example, NYSE Rule 405 requires persons associated
with NYSE member broker-dealers ("associated persons") to "use
due diligence to learn the essential facts" relative to the customer
when recommending transactions in securities.80 Although Rule 405
does not expressly require associated persons to recommend only suit-
J. Berkman, Suitability in Commodity Futures Trading, 20 Rev. Sec. & Commodities
Reg. 1, 2 n.5 (1987). Thus, broker-dealers are not obligated to determine the suitabil-
ity of unsolicited purchases, sales, or exchanges of securities.
76. NASD Manual (CCH) 2152, at 2050 (1995). This paragraph, which imposes
on registered representatives an affirmative duty to obtain information from custom-
ers, was made effective in January 1991. Id. Prior to this time, the issue of whether
broker-dealers had such an affirmative duty was unsettled. Thomas A. Russo & Mar-
lisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain Regulation: Selected Issues Re-
garding New Product Development, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1431, 1503 (1991).
77. NASD Manual (CCH) 2152, at 2050 (1995).
78. NASD Manual (CCH) 2183, at 2168 (1995). Section (A) of the options suit-
ability rule imposes a duty to recommend only suitable options transactions that is
virtually identical to the general suitability rule. Id. Section (B) adds the additional
requirements for recommendations of options transactions. Id.
79. This Note discusses only the NYSE suitability rules because a large percentage
of securities transactions occur on the NYSE. Jennings, supra note 11, at 65. The
suitability rules of other major national securities exchanges closely parallel the
NYSE rules. See American Stock Exchange: Constitution and Rules (CCH) 9431,
at 2647 (1988) (American Stock Exchange ("AMEX") general suitability rule); Id.
9723, at 3028 (1989) (AMEX options suitability rule); Chicago Board Options Ex-
change: Constitution and Rules (CCH) 2309, at 2135 (1982) (CBOE suitability
rule).
80. NYSE Rule 405 states in pertinent part: "Every member organization is re-
quired .. . to .. . [u]se due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every
customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such or-
ganization and every person holding power of attorney over any account accepted or
carried by such organization." 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) 2405, at 3696 (1994).
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able transactions to their customers, courts and commentators agree
that the rule imposes such a duty."' Additionally, NYSE Rule 723,
similar to the NASD options suitability rule, requires an associated
person recommending the purchase or sale of an option contract to
have a reasonable belief that the customer possesses the requisite
knowledge to understand, and the ability to bear the risks of, the op-
tions transaction.a2
The preceding discussion of NASD and exchange suitability rules
demonstrates that the suitability rules applicable to the recommenda-
tion of options transactions are well-defined. An investment profes-
sional recommending to a customer the purchase or sale of an option
contract must first obtain information regarding the customer's finan-
cial situation and objectives. He must then, based on the information
obtained from the customer, either (1) assure himself that the option
contract is suitable for the customer or (2) abstain from making the
recommendation. Additionally, the investment professional must
have a reasonable belief that the customer possesses the ability to un-
derstand, and the financial resources to absorb, the risks of the
transaction.
3. Applying the NASD and Exchange Suitability Rules
The NASD and exchange suitability rules provide basic principles
with which investment professionals must comply in recommending to
customers the purchase or sale of option contracts. The SEC has ex-
panded these principles in administrative hearings. This subsection il-
lustrates the application of the NASD and exchange suitability rules,
utilizing the Richbroker/Middiemanager transaction to highlight perti-
nent issues.
Compliance with the NASD and exchange suitability rules in rec-
ommending an options transaction involves analysis of several factors.
The customer's individual financial status is of primary importance.
The SEC has stated repeatedly that options are risky, speculative fi-
nancial instruments that expose investors to the potential for signifi-
cant losses.83 Thus, options trading is not suitable for customers with
81. Baker & Lawrence, supra note 26, at 286.
82. The full text of NYSE Rule 723 is as follows:
No member organization or member, allied member or employee of such
member organization shall recommend to a customer an opening transaction
in any option contract unless the person making the recommendation has a
reasonable basis for believing, at the time of making the recommendation,
that the customer has such knowledge and experience in financial matters
that he may reasonably be expected to be capable of evaluating the risks of
the recommended transaction, and is financially able to bear the risks of the
recommended position in the option contract.
2 NYSE Guide (CCH) 2723, at 4560 (1995).
83. See In re Keel, Exchange Act Release No. 31,716, 53 SEC Dock. 460, 461 (Jan.
11, 1993); In re Erdos, Exchange Act Release No. 20,376, 29 SEC Dock. 180, 181 n.5
(Nov. 16, 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1984).
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a limited net worth or low income.' 4 Nor should an investment pro-
fessional recommend options to a retired customer with a fixed in-
come,85 or a customer who depends on the funds generated from his
investments for daily living expenses.8 6
In response to an accusation of making an unsuitable recommenda-
tion, Richbroker may argue that Middlemanager's $65,000 annual sal-
ary and $150,000 net worth indicate that Middlemanager had
sufficient financial resources to engage in options trading. Addition-
ally, Richbroker may raise Middlemanager's expected inheritance in
his defense. Middlemanger's earnings and net worth, and the brief
discussion of the speculative inheritance, however, do not excuse
Richbroker's unsuitable recommendation. First, Richbroker took no
steps to discover the amount of the inheritance or when it was ex-
pected to arrive. Furthermore, a client's wealth does not relieve an
investment professional of his duty to determine suitability.' Other
factors may render options trading unsuitable even for a customer
with substantial financial resources.
A customer's individual circumstances apart from wealth must also
be considered when determining the suitability of options trading for
that customer. A customer's age, marital status, and responsibility for
dependents are relevant. An investment professional is likely to vio-
late suitability rules by suggesting the purchase or sale of options to an
elderly customer, as that customer does not have significant future
earning power.88 A customer's relative youth, however, does not en-
sure that options are suitable for that customer. A customer who, like
Middlemanager, is responsible for the financial support of others may
not have the discretionary income necessary to withstand the potential
losses inherent in options trading. Additionally, options are usually
inappropriate for a widow or widower who is dependent solely on his
or her income.89
In addition to a customer's financial and personal background, an
investment professional must address the customer's investment
objectives in determining suitability. Middlemanager noted on his
new account application that his investment objectives included pres-
ervation of principle and long-term growth. These investment objec-
tives are not consistent with the purchase of speculative call options. 0
84. See Keel, 53 SEC Dock. at 461.
85. See In re Wickswat, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,921, at 82,448 (Nov. 6, 1991).
86. See Erdos, 29 SEC Dock. at 181.
87. See In re Lewis, Exchange Act Release No. 29,794, 49 SEC Dock. 1487, 1488-
89 (Oct. 8, 1991).
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. In re Wickswat, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,921,
at 82,447 (Nov. 6, 1991); In re Keel, Exchange Act Release No. 31,716, 53 SEC Dock.
460, 460 (Jan. 11, 1993).
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Even a customer interested in short-term growth is not necessarily
suitable for options trading.91 An options transaction is appropriate
only for a customer who seeks aggressive growth and speculation.
Richbroker may argue that his recommendation was suitable because
Middlemanager was anxious to begin earning money for his children's
education and agreed to purchase options. Richbroker, however, had
a duty to make recommendations in accordance with Mid-
dlemanager's financial situation and objectives, notwithstanding Mid-
dlemanager's statements.92
In recommending an options transaction, an investment profes-
sional also must have a reasonable belief that the customer fully un-
derstands the nature and risks of the transaction.93 This reasonable
belief is necessary even if the customer consents or agrees that the
recommendation is appropriate. 4 Although disclosure of the risks of
options trading is required,95 disclosure alone is insufficient. An in-
vestment professional must look at a customer's prior investment ex-
perience to determine if the customer actually understands options
trading.96 A customer like Middlemanager, whose portfolio consists
only of conservative investments such as government bonds and blue
chip stocks, probably does not comprehend fully the risks inherent in
options trading.97 Richbroker's brief description of the mechanics of
options trading did not insure that Middlemanager had the requisite
understanding. Even a customer with significant experience in buying
and selling speculative stocks and high yield bonds might not under-
stand the particulars of option contracts.98
An investment professional cannot avoid suitability obligations by
stating that a customer failed to provide all relevant information. 9
The suitability rules impose an affirmative duty to make reasonable
efforts to acquire information regarding a customer's financial sta-
91. Keel, 53 SEC Dock. at 460.
92. In re Bruff, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 85,029, at 83,230
(Sept. 3, 1992); In re Erdos, Exchange Act Release No. 20,376,29 SEC Dock. 180, 183
(Nov. 16, 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1984).
93. NASD Manual (CCII) 2183, at 2168 (1995); NYSE Manual (CCII) '1 2723, at
4560 (1995).
94. See In re Wickswat, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1
84,921, at 82,447 (Nov. 6, 1991).
95. See Keel, 53 SEC Dock. at 461.
96. See In re Lewis, Exchange Act Release No. 29,794, 49 SEC Dock. 1487, 1489
(Oct. 8, 1991).
97. See In re Bruff, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) '1 85,029, at
83,228-29 (Sept. 3, 1992).
98. See In re Erdos, Exchange Act Release No. 20,376, 29 SEC Dock. 180, 183
(Nov. 16, 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1984).
99. For example, Middlemanager's failure to include the details of his expected
inheritence does not excuse Richbroker's unsuitable recommendation.
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tus. 100 If an investment professional is unable to obtain all the neces-
sary information, he cannot make recommendations based merely on
assumptions regarding the customer's financial situation and objec-
tives. Nor can a registered representative excuse the recommendation
of unsuitable securities by claiming he did not realize the recommen-
dation was unsuitable. Ignorance of his business does not relieve an
investment professional of suitability obligations.' 0'
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the NASD would prob-
ably impose disciplinary sanctions on Richbroker for the recommen-
dation of an unsuitable investment. 1° Middlemanager, however, will
not be able to recover from Richbroker or Stockseller the $3500 he
lost as a result of Richbroker's unsuitable recommendation. Courts
have consistently held that there is no implied private cause of action
for the violation of NASD or exchange rules.10 3 Thus, although Rich-
broker's actions obviously did not comport with the requirement of
fair dealing implicit in the broker-customer relationship, 04 Mid-
dlemanager is left without a remedy.
4. Section 10(b) and Suitability
Middlemanager may pursue alternative avenues to recover the
$3500 lost as a result of the Bigcompany call options transaction. On
occasion, courts have held that the recommendation of unsuitable se-
curities constitutes a violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.10 5 In order to establish a section
10(b) claim against an investment professional for injuries resulting
from an unsuitable options transaction, a customer must prove the fol-
lowing elements: (1) that the recommended options were unsuitable
for the customer based on the customer's financial situation and
objectives; (2) that the investment professional knew or had reason to
know that the options were unsuitable; (3) that the investment profes-
sional recommended the options transaction despite knowledge of un-
100. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see also In re Greenberg, 40 SEC
133, 137-38 (July 21, 1960) (finding that a registered representative cannot rely solely
on information volunteered by the customer in determining suitability).
101. See In re F.J. Kaufman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 27,535, 45 SEC
Dock. 97, 102 (Dec. 13, 1989).
102. NASD disciplinary sanctions for the recommendation of unsuitable securities
include fines, suspension from the securities business, and requirement of requalifica-
tion by examination. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., NASD Sanction
Guidelines 43 (1993).
103. See, e.g., Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1980) (find-
ing absence of congressional intent to create a private cause of action arising solely
out of rules violations).
104. See In re Lewis, Exchange Act Release No. 29,794, 49 SEC Dock. 1487, 1488
(Oct. 8, 1991).
105. See Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993);
O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1992); Clark v. John
Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1978).
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suitability;, (4) scienter; and (5) justifiable detrimental reliance. 106
Some courts find scienter if the customer demonstrates that the in-
vestment professional misrepresented or failed to disclose the unsuita-
bility of the options transaction.0 7 Other courts, however, require an
intent to defraud or a reckless disregard for the customer's interests to
establish the scienter necessary to prevail on a section 10(b) unsuita-
bility claim.' 08
Several difficulties arise in attempting to establish liability for un-
suitable recommendations under section 10(b). First, a customer
grounding his section 10(b) claim in unsuitability alone may have diffi-
culty satisfying the scienter requirement if this element is premised on
an intent to defraud or a reckless disregard for the customer's inter-
ests.' °9 Additionally, an investment professional can escape liability
under section 10(b) by demonstrating that, based on the information
provided by the customer, he did not know or have reason to know
that the recommendations were unsuitable. The section 10(b) knowl-
edge requirement does not impose an affirmative duty to obtain infor-
mation sufficient to make suitable recommendations. Finally, an
investment professional may be able to disprove the reliance element
simply by showing that he disclosed the risks and possible unsuitabil-
ity of the recommendation to the customer, even if he did not take
steps to insure that the customer fully understood this information.110
Thus, it is extemely difficult for customers injured by unsuitable rec-
ommendations to succeed under section 10(b)."'
B. Futures
This section analyzes the rules that govern futures positions similar
to Leisure's long position in gold futures. This section first expands
the description of the Futuresdealer/Leisure transaction to illustrate
suitability issues that arise in futures trading. It then discusses the
CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction over futures contracts and describes the
106. See Brown, 991 F.2d at 1031.
107. See, e.g., id ("Scienter may be inferred by finding that the defendant knew or
reasonably believed that the securities were unsuited to the investor's needs, mis-
reprented or failed to disclose the unsuitability of the securities, and proceeded to
recommend... the securities anyway.").
108. See, e.g., O'Connor, 965 F.2d at 898-99 ("[F]or unsuitability a plaintiff must
show the broker [recommended] the securities with an intent to defraud or with reck-
less disregard for the investor's interests.").
109. See id. at 898-900. In O'Connor, the court found no scienter where the de-
fendant broker-dealer testified that he believed the recommended investments were
only "modestly risky" and personally investigated the recommended investments. Id.
at 899-900. The fact that the customer in O'Connor was notified of the activity in her
account also weighed against a finding of scienter. Id. at 900.
110. See Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1032 (2d Cir. 1993).
111. See Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 76, at 1507 ("[P]roving a [Rule lOb-15
violation.., requires a good deal more than proof of failure to comply with [NASD
and exchange] suitability requirements ....").
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CFTC's past and current position on suitability. This section demon-
strates that CFTC rules do not protect customers from unsuitable fu-
tures transactions.
1. The Futuresdealer/Leisure Futures Transaction' 12
Leisure retired in 1993 from his position as a biology professor at
the University of Anystate. Leisure receives a pension of $90,000 per
year and a monthly payment of $2250 from a fixed annuity. Hoping to
purchase a beachfront home in Florida, Leisure contacted Fu-
turesdealer to discuss growth investments."13
At Leisure's initial meeting with Futuresdealer, the futures commis-
sion merchant recommended that Leisure invest in futures contracts
to accumulate funds for his Florida dream house. Although Leisure's
prior investment experience consisted primarily of buying and selling
blue chip common stocks, he had previously entered into futures con-
tracts on two occasions. Eager to earn a high rate of return on his
money and build his Florida estate as soon as possible, Leisure de-
cided to follow Futuresdealer's advice and invest in futures contracts.
Leisure indicated to Futuresdealer that he had $125,000 of risk capital
available to trade futures. 1 4 He also signed a risk disclosure state-
ment provided to him by Futuresdealer which discussed the risks in-
volved in futures trading.115
Futuresdealer recommended that Leisure establish a long position
in ten gold futures contracts with a futures price of $381 per ounce and
a delivery month four months in the future."16 Because each contract
is for the purchase and sale of 100 ounces of gold," 7 the total value of
the position was $381,000. Leisure deposited the required initial mar-
gin amount of $100,000118 and established the position. Unfortu-
112. The hypothetical futures transaction is not based on a particular case but was
designed to illustrate issues highlighted in various materials.
113. Growth investments generally provide a greater return, and a greater risk,
than the overall market. Pass Trak, supra note 2, at 417.
114. Because Leisure already had an account with Commodityco, he did not fill out
a new account application. Futuresdealer did not look at the copy of Leisure's new
account application contained in his fie nor did she take any steps to obtain informa-
tion about Leisure's current financial situation.
115. Futures professionals are required under 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1995) to provide a
risk disclosure statement to customers establishing futures positions.
116. For a discussion of the terminology used in futures trading, see supra note 5.
117. See Ross, supra note 2, at 709.
118. The initial margin is the amount an investor is required to deposit in an ac-
count ("margin account") upon establishing a futures position. Hull, supra note 2, at
23. At the end of each trading day, the margin account is adjusted to reflect the
investor's gain or loss for that trading day. Id. This procedure is referred to as "mark-
ing to market." Id. If there is a gain, the margin account is increased and the investor
is entitled to withdraw any amount in excess of the initial margin. Id. at 23-24. If,
however, as a result of losses, the margin account falls below a certain level ("mainte-
nance margin"), the investor receives a margin call and must deposit funds to return
the account to the initial margin. Id.
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nately, the price of gold fell to $350 per ounce over the next two
months. This price decrease caused the balance in Leisure's account
to fall below the maintenance margin of $75,000.119 Thus, Leisure re-
ceived a margin call for $25,000 to return his account to the initial
margin level. Instead of paying the $25,000, Leisure contacted a
lawyer.
2. The CFTC and Suitability
All transactions in futures contracts are subject to the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the cFTC. 120 Thus, a futures professional recommending
futures contracts to a customer must comply with all applicable CFTC
rules and regulations. 2' Although the CFTC does not currently have
a suitability rule, it has addressed suitability in the context of futures
trading. This subsection discusses a suitability rule proposed and dis-
119. Because the price of gold dropped $31 per ounce from $381 to $350 per ounce,
the value of Leisure's position fell $31,000 (31 x 10 x 100). This loss decreased his
margin account from $100,000 to $69,000. See Hull, supra note 2, at 23.
120. The CFTC was established under § 2(a)(2) of the CEA. 7 U.S.C. § 4a(a)(1)
(1994). Under CEA § 2(a)(1)(B), the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over all futures
contracts, and options on futures contracts, traded or executed on a "contract mar-
ket" designated as such by the CFTC under § 2 of the CEA. 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii) (1994); 7
U.S.C. § 7 (1994). Moreover, under § 4(a) and § 4h of the CEA, it is unlawful to
transact in, or conduct a business for the purposes of transacting in, futures contracts
or options on futures contracts other than on a designated contract market. 7 U.S.C.
§ 6(a) (1994); 7 U.S.C. § 6h (1994); see Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d
537,539 (7th Cir. 1989); Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673,674-75 (11th Cir.
1988).
Additionally, the CFTC requires registration of all futures professionals including
commodity trading advisors, 7 U.S.C. § 6m(1) (1994), commodity pool operators, id.,
futures commission merchants, 7 U.S.C. § 6d(1) (1994), introducing brokers, id., floor
traders or brokers, 7 U.S.C. § 6e (1994), and persons associated therewith. 7 U.S.C.
§ 6k(1) (1994).
Under § 4c of the CEA, the CFTC also has exclusive jurisdiction over all transac-
tions in options on commodities. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (1994). The CF'C prohibits en-
tirely the trading of options on agricultural commodities. 17 C.F.R1 § 32.2 (1995).
The CEA provides certain limited exceptions to CFTC jurisdiction. First, forward
contracts, generally defined as agreements for the sale of a "cash commodity for de-
ferred shipment or delivery," are exempt from CFTC regulation. 7 U.S.C. § la(11)
(1994). Forward contracts are similar to futures contracts, but, unlike futures, are
privately negotiated between parties who do business in the underlying commodity
and have the intent and capacity to make or take delivery of the commodity. See
Bybee v. Krommenhoek, 945 F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1991); 55 Fed. Reg. 39,188,
39,190-91 (1990). Second, under § 4c of the CEA, "dealer options" are exempt from
CFTC regulation. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(d) (1994). A dealer option is a commodity option
offered to a "producer, processor, or commercial user of, or a merchant handling" the
commodity underlying the option that enters into the option contract for purposes
related to its business. 17 C.F.R § 32.4 (1995). Finally, the Treasury Amendment
contained in § 2(ii) of the CEA removes "individually-negotiated foreign currency
option and futures transactions between sophisticated, large-scale foreign currency
traders" from CFTC jurisdiction. Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 978 (4th
Cir. 1993).
121. The CFTC's rulemaking power is granted under §§ 2(a) and 8a of the CEA. 7
U.S.C. § 4a(j) (1994); 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5) (1994).
1995]
118 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
carded by the CFTC. Additionally, this subsection analyzes unsuita-
bility as a cause of action under the antifraud provisions contained in
the CEA.
a. The CFTC's Proposed Suitability Rule
In the late 1970s, the CFTC proposed a rule that would have im-
posed on futures professionals the legal duty to recommend only suit-
able investments.'22 Proposed Rule 166.2 would have required
futures professionals, prior to recommending a futures transaction, to
obtain the essential facts regarding the customer's financial condition
and trading objectives. 23 These essential facts included, but were not
limited to, the customer's net worth, income, number of dependents,
122. Proposed CFTC Rule 166.2 stated in pertinent part:
Suitability of recommendations and discretionary trades.
(a) No Commission registrant or representative thereof may, directly
or indirectly, make any recommendation to any customer concerning
the purchase, sale or continued holding of any commodity interest...
unless the Commission registrant or representative thereof-
(1) Within a reasonable period of time before the recommendation
(i) Obtained from the customer the essential facts about the
customer's financial condition and trading objectives, and
(ii) Verified with the customer the accuracy of that information
if previously obtained and
(2) At the time of the recommendation or transaction, had reason
to believe that the recommendation ... was suitable for the cus-
tomer in light of
(i) The information obtained from the customer and otherwise
known about the customer by the Commission registrant or
representative thereof, and
(ii) The risk of loss involved therein.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "recommendation" means
any advice, suggestion or other statement that is intended, or can rea-
sonably be expected, to influence a customer to purchase, sell or hold a
commodity interest, but does not include any statement that merely de-
scribes in an objective fashion the commodity interest, the manner in
which it is traded or the service of the Commission registrant or repre-
sentative thereof.
(c) This section does not apply to recommendations furnished solely
through-
(1) Uniform publications distributed to subscribers thereto,
(2) Books,
(3) Television or radio communications, or
(4) Seminar or lecture presentations.
42 Fed. Reg. 44,742, 44,750 (1977) (proposed Sept. 6, 1977).
If adopted, Rule 166.2 would have provided customers with a private cause of ac-
tion for violations of the rule. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a) (1994).
123. 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742, 44,750 (1977). The CFTC noted these factors in its discus-
sion surrounding Rule 166.2. The Commission further noted that, because suitability
is fact specific, establishment of fixed standards would be inappropriate. See id. at
44,744.
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financial obligations, and other investments. 14 If a futures profes-
sional could not gather the necessary information, proposed Rule
166.2 would have prohibited him from making a recommendation. 2'
Additionally, proposed Rule 166.2 would have required that futures
professionals have a "reason to believe that [a] recommendation...
was suitable for [a] customer" prior to making the recommenda-
tion.'" Under Rule 166.2, suitability would have depended on
whether the risk of loss involved in the recommended futures transac-
tion was "(a) one that the customer could safely assume in light of his
financial condition and (b) consistent with the customer's trading
objectives."' 27 A futures professional subject to Rule 166.2 would
have had to reasonably believe that both futures trading in general,
and the particular recommended transaction, were suitable for the
customer.128
In proposing Rule 166.2, the CFTC stressed the necessity for a suit-
ability rule applicable to futures transactions. 1 2 9 The CFTC stated
that most customers are unaware of the substantial risk of loss inher-
ent in futures trading.131 The CFTC further reasoned that, because
futures contracts can be purchased on relatively small margins and
because market prices of such contracts often fluctuate rapidly, cus-
tomers purchasing and selling futures contracts can lose significantly
more than their original investment.' 3' Additionally, the CFTC, in
addressing the necessity of a suitability rule, noted that disclosure,
while necessary, is not sufficient to protect customers.' 32 The CFTC
believed that disclosure alone did not protect customers from the high
pressure sales tactics often engaged in by futures professionals. 33
Moreover, the CFTC stated that, because futures professionals have
the skills and background necessary to analyze the risks of futures
trading, the duty to assess such risks should lie with these profession-
124. Id. While possession of other speculative investments might indicate a cus-
tomer's understanding of futures trading, the CFTC in proposing Rule 1662 indicated
that such investments render the recommendation of futures transactions unsuitable.
Id The CFTC reasoned that a customer already committed to other forms of specula-
tion should not be exposed to further risk. Id.
125. Id at 44,743. A futures professional could usually, however, rely on the cus-
tomer's statements without having to make a further inquiry to verify the information.
Id at 44,744. Nonetheless, further inquiry would be necessary if he had good cause to
believe that the information was materially inaccurate. l
126. Id. at 44,750.
127. Id. at 44,743. The CFITC specifically stated that futures trading may be unsuit-
able for customers seeking production of income and preservation of capital. Id. at
44,744.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 44,743-44.
130. Id. at 44,743.
131. Id. at 44,743-44.




als. 34 Futures professionals should not transfer the risks of futures
trading to the customer.135
Notwithstanding its reasoning in favor of adopting a suitability rule
governing the recommendation of futures transactions, the CFTC de-
clined to adopt proposed Rule 166.2.136 The CFTC based its decision
not to adopt the rule on the CFTC's inability to formulate "meaning-
ful standards of universal application."' 137 Apparently, the CFTC was
addressing the difficulty of determining standards regarding (1) the
degree of risk involved in various futures transactions and (2) the par-
ticular customer objectives for which futures trading would be inap-
propriate. 138 This reasoning, however, is contrary to the CFTC's
earlier statement that the fact specific nature of suitability argues
against setting fixed standards.13F Instead of a suitability rule, the
CFTC adopted a mandatory disclosure rule requiring futures profes-
sionals, prior to making a recommendation, to furnish customers with
a written statement describing the risks of futures trading.' 40 This
written statement suggests that customers should consider whether fu-
tures trading is suitable for their situation.' 4' After the statement is
provided to the customer, the futures professional is relieved of any
suitability obligations and the duty to determine suitability is trans-
ferred to the customer.142
b. Unsuitability as a Violation of the CEA Antifraud Provisions
At one time, the recommendation of an unsuitable futures transac-
tion was thought to violate the antifraud provisions contained in sec-
tion 4b of the CEA.143 Prior to the CFTC's decision in Phacelli v.
ContiCommodity Services, Inc.,144 several CFTC Administrative Law
Judges deciding suitability cases found liability for unsuitable recom-
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,887 (1978).
137. Id. at 31,888.
138. See Berkman, supra note 75, at 2.
139. See supra note 123.
140. 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,887 (1978). The risk disclosure requirement is set forth
in 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1995).
141. 17 C.F.R. § 1.55(b) (1995).
142. See M. Van Smith, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and Suitabil-
ity: Now You See it, Now You Don't, 60 Deny. LU. 613, 626 (1983).
143. Section § 4b of the CEA prohibits fraudulent or deceitful practices in connec-
tion with futures transactions. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1994). The elements necessary to estab-
lish § 4b liability parallel those required for liability under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
Rule lob-5 promulgated thereunder. Trustman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,490, at
30,167 (C.D. Cal. 1985).




mendations under section 4b.145 In Phacelli, however, the CFTC ex-
pressly stated that a futures professional does not violate section 4b
"merely because he fails to determine whether a customer is suitable
for [futures] trading."1 6 Subsequent CFTC and court decisions have
consistently followed Phacelli in holding that no legal duty to recom-
mend only suitable futures transactions arises under section 4b of the
CEA.147 The preceding discussion demonstrates that the CFTC does
not currently have an explicit suitability rule, and that no such rule is
implicit in section 4b of the CEA. Thus, Leisure is left without a rem-
edy for his injuries resulting from Futuresdealer's careless
recommendation.
II. SWAPS
The initial inquiry in addressing suitability in the context of options
and futures is whether there exist suitability rules applicable to these
types of derivatives. The applicable body of law to look to in answer-
ing this question is well-settled. For swaps, however, a court or ad-
ministrative agency must first determine what law to apply in
analyzing the legality of swap transactions.
This part looks at what regulatory framework should govern swaps
similar to Producestuff's interest rate swap. Section A provides a de-
tailed description of the Moneylender/Producestuff transaction to em-
phasize legal issues involved in swap transactions. Section B analyzes
145. Se4 e.g., Shefter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,022, at 32,030 (CFTC 1986)
("[U]nder some circumstances.... a violation of suitability standards is a violation of
the [CA]. .... ").
146. Phacelli v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,250, at 32,674 (CFTC 1986). The CFTC in Phaceli, how-
ever, did provide two limited exceptions to the rule that § 4b liability cannot be im-
posed for suitability violations. First, the CFTC stated that § 4b liability will attach
when a futures professional's recommendation of unsuitable futures contracts
amounts to "overreaching," as when such professional takes advantage of an "excep-
tionally gullible" or "dim-witted" customer. let Second, a futures professional will be
found liable under § 4b if he affirmatively misrepresents the suitability of a recom-
mendation and the customer relies on the misrepresentation. I& at 32,674-75.
147. See Dyer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 928 F.2d 238,241 (7th
Cir. 1991); Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 903 F.2d 1014, 1020 (5th
Cir. 1990); Bardwell v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., [1990-1992 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,945, at 37,460 (CFTC 1990); Foster v. First Commod-
ity Corp., [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,970, at 34,405
(CFTC 1987).
A customer seeking to recover against a futures professional for injuries resulting
from unsuitable recommendations may attempt to argue that such futures profes-
sional breached his common law fiduciary duty owed to the customer. Van Smith,
supra note 142, at 626-27. Most courts, however, hold that brokers do not owe a duty
to determine suitability unless the customer's account is discretionary. See Wasnick v.
Refco, Inc., 911 F.2d 345, 349-50 (9th Cir. 1990); Sherry v. Diercks, 628 P.2d 1336,
1341 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981); see also Lefkowitz v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham &
Co., 804 F.2d 154, 155 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that common law fiduciary duty does
not arise from simple stockbroker-customer relationship).
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swaps as securities under the federal securities laws and Section C
considers swaps as futures contracts subject to CFTC jurisdiction.
Section D examines federal regulation of swaps recommended by
banks.
A. The Moneylender/Producestuff Swap Transaction'48
Producestuff is a privately held company incorporated in Denver,
Colorado. The company has a current net worth of approximately
$2,500,000 and an average annual after-tax income of $750,000.
Producestuff finances the majority of its operations with debt. A fi-
nance department staffed by Financeman, the manager, and twenty
employees determines Producestuff's borrowing needs. Financeman
possesses an advanced business degree and Producestuff hired him
specifically for his expertise in corporate finance. The finance depart-
ment employees, however, have no specialized financial training.
Moneylender is a nationally chartered bank and handles Produces-
tuff's borrowing needs. This banking relationship dates back to
Producestuff 's founding five years ago. In addition to making loans to
Producestuff, Moneylender advises the company regarding how best
to finance its operations. 149 Accordingly, Moneylender possesses sig-
nificant information regarding Producestuff's cash flow, investments,
strategic plans, and risk tolerance.
Producestuff traditionally financed its operations through short-
term loans from Moneylender with floating interest rates based on the
three-month commercial paper rate.' 50 Last month, however, after
Producestuff reported an annual earnings increase of twenty-five per-
cent for the previous year, a large investment bank approached the
company's finance department. Based on its confidence in Produces-
tuff's ability to continually increase earnings, the investment bank of-
fered to underwrite a bond issue for the company.151 Producestuff,
interested in locking in a fixed interest rate for its debt, agreed to pro-
ceed with the bond issue. Producestuff pays interest on the bonds
semi-annually at a rate of six and one-half percent.
148. The hypothetical swap transaction and the circumstances surrounding it are
based on various readings consulted by the author.
149. Moneylender does not offer investment banking services.
150. Commercial paper consists of short-term notes with varying maturities issued
by large companies with good credit ratings. Ross, supra note 2, at 766-67. Produces-
tuff did not itself issue commercial paper. Instead, it entered into traditional loan
agreements with Moneylender. Under these agreements, Producestuff would pay in-
terest monthly, but the rate of interest would be adjusted every three months accord-
ing to the three-month commercial paper rate. The three-month commercial paper
rate generally lies between the three-month and one-year treasury bill rates.
151. Because Producestuff's previous earnings were negative or very low, the com-




Producestuff sells its products through various distributors nation-
wide. These distributors purchase the products with revolving credit
issued by Producestuff. The interest paid on the revolving creditis
based on the three-month commercial paper rate and the credit agree-
ments can be renegotiated every two years. 15 Producestuff's obliga-
tions under the bond issue exposed the company to the risk of
commercial paper rates falling to a level well below six and one-half
percent, resulting in incoming payments from distributors being signif-
icantly lower than outgoing payments to the bondholders.
Seeking to hedge this risk, Fmanceman and a special team of five
finance department employees approached Moneylender for advice.
Moneylender suggested an interest rate swap. 5 3 Financeman and the
special team agreed that an interest rate swap agreement appeared
appropriate. Financeman, however, stressed certain objectives that
Producestuff had in entering into a swap agreement with Money-
lender. First, Producestuff wanted to make payments based on a
floating rate of interest that closely paralleled the three-month com-
mercial paper rate." Additionally, Producestuff desired to make
payments at relatively frequent intervals to avoid exposure to interest
rate fluctuations. Moneylender stated that, as an expert in designing
"proprietary"'155 swaps, it could tailor an interest rate swap to meet
Producestuff's particular needs.
The interest rate swap recommended by Moneylender to Produces-
tuff is embodied in the following contract ("Swap Agreement"):
SWAP AGREEMENT
1. Commencing February 1, 1994, Moneylender, Incorporated
agrees to make payments to Producestuff, Incorporated
based on a fixed interest rate of six and one-half percent
(6.50%).
2. Producestuff agrees to make payments to Moneylender
based on a floating rate of interest equal to:
[[(thirty-year T-bond 5 6 rate) - (three-month T-bill'57
rate)] x 2.5] + 1.7
152. The Producestuff finance department structured the revolving credit agree-
ments to correspond with the loan agreements with Moneylender. If the three-month
commercial paper rate increased, the payments received from distributors would in-
crease along with the payments made to Moneylender.
153. For a description of swaps, see supra note 8.
154. This payment arrangement would correspond with the payments received
from distributors.
155. "Proprietary" swaps are complex and specialized swaps designed by a swap
dealer to meet a customer's particular needs. Complaint at 5, Proctor & Gamble Co.
v. Bankers Trust Co., Civ. No. C-1-94-735 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 1994).
156. A Treasury bond, or "T-bond," is a long-term (10 to 30 years), fixed-interest
federal government debt security. Pass Trak, supra note 2, at 63.
157. A Treasury bill, or "T-bill," is a short-term (90 days to one year) federal gov-
ernment security issued at a discount from par. t at 62.
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3. The payments described in paragraphs one and two will be
made on a ten million dollar ($10,000,000) notional
principal.
4. The payments described in paragraphs one and two will be
made at six-month intervals.
5. The duration of this Swap Agreement is fifteen years.
6. The creditworthiness of Producestuff and Moneylender is a
material consideration of the parties in entering into this
Swap Agreement.
7. This Swap Agreement requires Producestuff to deposit one
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) in cash as collateral.
On August 1, 1994, the T-bond rate was 7.56% and the T-bill rate
was 5.72%. Thus, Moneylender satisfied its obligations under the
Swap Agreement with a $10,000 payment to Producestuff. Between
August 1, 1994 and February 1, 1995, however, the disparity between
T-bill and T-bond rates widened significantly. On February 1, the T-
bond rate was 8.60% and the T-bill rate was 5.00%. Thus, under the
Swap Agreement, Producestuff paid $210,000 to Moneylender. The
size of this payment concerned Producestuff. The commercial paper
rate had fallen to 5.25% and thus interest payments from distributors
were lower than they had been previously. Financeman and the spe-
cial team could not understand why Producestuff's payments under
the swap agreement had increased dramatically while payments from
distributors had fallen.
The finance department notified Moneylender of its disappoint-
ment with the swap transaction. Moneylender assured Producestuff
that the large disparity between T-bond and T-bill rates was unusual
and would probably decrease shortly. On July 15, 1995, however, the
rates were even further apart, with the T-bond rate at 8.80% and the
T-bill rate at 4.90%. Producestuff, realizing the magnitude of the pay-
ment it would have to make on August 1 if the difference between T-
bond and T-bill rates continued to increase, notified Moneylender of
its intention not to make the August 1 payment. Producestuff then
contacted a laywer.
B. Swaps as Securities
A party arguing that swaps are securities would probably contend
that swaps are either "investment contracts" or "notes" under the
1933 and 1934 Acts.15 Well-settled standards determine whether a
financial instrument falls within the investment contract category or
the note category. This subsection analyzes swaps under both
frameworks, utilizing the Moneylender/Producestuff interest rate
swap as a representative swap transaction. This subsection concludes
158. See Edward F. Greene et al., U.S. Regulation of the International Securities
Markets 820 (2d ed. 1993).
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that most swaps do not fall within either the investment contract or
note class of security.
1. Swaps as Investment Contracts
An "investment contract" consists of a contract, transaction, or
scheme in which an investor (1) invests his money, (2) in a common
enterprise, (3) with the reasonable expectation of profits, (4) derived
from the efforts of others.159 Satisfaction of the first prong, invest-
ment of money, requires a commitment of assets in such a manner as
to subject the investor to financial loss.160 A "common enterprise"
under the second prong is present if either of the following situations
exists: (a) an enterprise common to the investor and the promoter,
seller, or third party ("vertical commonality"), or (b) an enterprise
common to a group of investors ("horizontal commonality").16' Verti-
cal commonality exists when the investor's fortunes rise and fall along
with those of the promoter, seller, or third party.16- A showing of
collective fortunes dependent on the success of a single common en-
terprise establishes horizontal commonality.'63 As to the third prong,
a reasonable expectation of profits means either an expectation of
capital appreciation or a participation in earnings.' 1 Profits are de-
rived from the efforts of others, in satisfaction of the fourth element, if
the managerial efforts of parties other than the investor are essential
to the success or failure of the enterprise.165
Considering the Moneylender/Producestuff transaction as an repre-
sentative swap agreement, a court addressing the issue would proba-
bly not consider swaps to be investment contracts.'6 First, neither
Producestuff nor Moneylender made a true commitment of assets in
entering into the swap transaction; the parties agreed only to ex-
159. SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
160. SEC v. Comcoa, 855 F. Supp. 1258, 1260 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
161. SEC v. R.G. Reynolds, 952 F.2d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991).
162. Pliskin v. Bruno, 838 F. Supp. 658, 664 (D. Me. 1993). Some courts find verti-
cal commonality where the investor's fortunes are only linked to, as opposed to being
interwoven with, those of the seller, promoter, or third party. See Kaplan v. Shapiro,
655 F. Supp. 336, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The majority view, however, requires the
stricter version of vertical commonality-interdependence of fortunes. See generally
Maura K. Monaghan, An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common Enterprise
Element of Investment Contract Analysis, 63 Fordham L Rev. 2135 (1995) (discussing
the unsettled nature of the law surrounding the common enterprise element of the
Howey test).
163. Kaplan, 655 F. Supp. at 340.
164. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 44
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)).
165. R.G. Reynolds, 952 F.2d at 1131.
166. Greene, supra note 158, at 820; David J. Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial




change funds at a future date. 67 Second, the swap does not appear to
involve a common enterprise under either the vertical or horizontal
test. 168 The interest rate swap agreement did not result in Produces-
tuff's fortunes being interwoven with Moneylender's and thus failed
to satisfy the standard for vertical commonality. In fact, when
Producestuff experienced a cash inflow under the swap, Moneylender
experienced a cash outflow.169 Nor is there the requisite pooling of
interests necessary to establish horizontal commonality; there are only
two singular parties on opposite sides of a transaction. Furthermore,
in entering into the interest rate swap agreement, Producestuff did not
expect profits in the form of capital appreciation or participation in
earnings. Instead, Producestuff sought to hedge its exposure to inter-
est rate fluctuations and expected returns based only on a floating in-
terest rate.170 Finally, any gain accruing to Producestuff under the
interest rate swap agreement arose, not from the managerial efforts of
others, but from changes in underlying interest rates.17
2. Swaps as Notes
In order to determine whether a financial instrument is a "rote"
included in the definitions of "security" contained in the 1933 and
1934 Acts, a court must apply the "family resemblance test" articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst & Young. 72 In Reves,
the Court stated that any "note" with a maturity of more than nine
months is a security, unless it resembles one of several instruments not
properly viewed as securities. 173  A court assesses resemblance
through consideration of four factors set out in Reves.174 These four
167. See supra part II.A. for a description of the Producestuff/Moneylender swap
transaction.
168. See P&C Inv. Club v. Becker, 520 F. Supp. 120, 122 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (noting
that investment is "individual," not common, when any potential profit arises from
the favorable movement of an underlying asset).
169. This situation would arise when the floating rate was below the fixed rate on
the agreed upon payment date.
170. See Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 44
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding no expectation of profits where rate of return consisted of
repayment of principal plus fixed rate of interest).
171. See id.
172. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
173. Reves, 494 U.S. at 65 & n.3. The instruments listed that are not deemed securi-
ties include the following:
[1] the note delivered in consumer financing, [2] the note secured by a mort-
gage on a home, [3] the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business
or some of its assets, [4] the note evidencing a "character" loan to a bank
customer, [5] short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts receiva-
ble, [and] [6] a note which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred
in the ordinary course of business.
Id at 65 (quoting Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d
Cir. 1976)).




factors include (1) the motivation of the buyer and seller in entering
into the transaction, (2) the plan of distribution of the instrument, (3)
the reasonable expectations of the investing public, and (4) whether
some element significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thus
rendering application of the securities laws unnecessary ("Reves
factors"). 75
The first Reves factor, motivation of the parties, looks to whether
the parties entered into the transaction for investment or commercial
purposes. 76 Investment purposes indicate that the instrument at issue
is a security, while commercial purposes indicate that it falls outside
the scope of the federal securities laws. 177 The parties' motivation is
investment-related if (1) the seller entered into the transaction to raise
money for the general use of a business enterprise or to finance sub-
stantial investments, and (2) the buyer entered into the transaction in
expectation of a profit. 178 If, however, the purpose of the transaction
is to advance commercial purposes such as the facilitation of the
purchase and sale of an asset, or the correction of cash-flow difficul-
ties, the motivation factor will weigh against classifying the instrument
as a security.179 The second Reves factor, the plan of distribution, in-
dicates a security if the instrument at issue is offered to a broad seg-
ment of the investing public.18 If the investing public would generally
view the instrument as a security, the third Reeves factor weighs in
favor of including the instrument within the scope of the federal secur-
ities laws. 18 1 Finally, elements supporting classification of the instru-
ment as a security under the fourth Reves factor include a short
maturity' 82 and the absence of a separate regulatory scheme gov-
erning the purchase and sale of the instrument.18
Again using the Moneylender/Producestuff swap transaction as an
example, courts would probably not categorize swaps as notes gov-
erned by the federal securities laws. 181 First, the motivation of
Producestuff and Moneylender in entering into the swap agreement
was commercial. Producestuff's intent was to protect against interest
rate fluctuations and Moneylender's purpose was to earn its fee and
provide a service to a long-term banking customer. Moreover, Mon-
eylender did not intend the swap for distribution to a broad segment
175. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66-67.
176. Pollack, 27 F.3d at 812.
177. Id.
178. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66. For purposes of the analysis under the first Reves factor,
interest payments can be considered "profit." it at 68 nA.
179. Id at 66.
180. Pollack, 27 F.3d at 813-14; cf. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l
Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36,42-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding no security where plan of distri-
bution was a limited solicitation to sophisticated financial or commercial institutions).
181. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66.
182. See SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., 952 F.2d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 1991).
183. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 67; Banco Espanol, 763 F. Supp. at 43.
184. See Greene, supra note 158, at 820.
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of the investing public. Instead, the swap agreement was a privately
negotiated transaction between two corporate entities. The absence
of an "investing public" with respect to the interest rate swap indicates
that the third Reves factor weighs against classifying the swap as a
security. Finally, the fourth Reves factor also appears to keep the
swap outside the scope of the federal securities laws. The term of the
swap was fifteen years and Moneylender's activities are subject to
oversight by federal banking regulators. 85
Thus, although the definitions of "security" found in the 1933 and
1934 Acts are "broadly construed by... courts.., to afford the invest-
ing public a full measure of protection,"'186 swaps do not appear to fall
within these definitions. Swaps are usually unique, privately negoti-
ated, nontransferable instruments that are not offered to the public.
Such instruments are not generally considered securities by the invest-
ment community or the federal securities laws.187
C. Swaps as Futures
Swap agreements have some economic features similar to futures
contracts, thus potentially bringing swaps under the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the CFTC."m Interest rate swaps, for example, exhibit func-
tions and effects analogous to futures contracts on T-bills and T-
bonds.'89 Both interest rate swaps and treasury futures are dependent
on interest rate movements and are often used to hedge against expo-
sure to such fluctuations. 190 Additionally, treasury futures, similar to
interest rate swaps, are frequently settled by cash payments. 91 Fi-
nally, clauses in swap agreements requiring the deposit and mainte-
nance of collateral are similar to initial and maintenance margin
requirements present in futures trading.192
Swaps, however, lack several identifying characteristics of CFTC-
regulated futures contracts. 93 The terms of exchange-traded futures
contracts are standardized, while swap agreements have few, if any,
standardized terms. 194 Additionally, futures contracts allow for daily
185. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
186. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
187. See Mace Neufeld Prods. v. Orion Pictures Corp., 860 F.2d 944, 946 (9th Cir.
1988) (noting that an agreement that is "not publicly offered or traded,... unique,
and ... negotiated 'one-on-one' by the parties" is not a security under the federal
securities laws).
188. See Greene, supra note 158, at 840. For a discussion of the CFTC's exclusivejurisdiction over futures trading, see supra note 120.
189. Gilberg, supra note 166, at 1646. Futures contracts on T-bills and T-bonds are
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC. See supra note 120 and accompany-
ing text.
190. See id.






marking to market; 95 swap agreements do not provide for any such
arrangement 1 96 Moreover, large commercial entities generally nego-
tiate swap agreements among themselves for hedging purposes spe-
cific to their lines of business. 197 By contrast, investment professionals
regularly market futures to the public and individual investors often
use futures for speculative purposes. 198
The CFTC recognizes these important distinctions between futures
contracts and swap transactions and has expressed its intent not to
bring swaps under CFTC jurisdiction. 99 In 1989, through issuance of
its Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions,2 m the CFTC indi-
cated that it would not attempt to regulate swaps. Subsequently,
under authority granted by the Futures Trading Practices Act of
1992,201 the CFTC exempted certain swap agreements from its over-
sight. 2  Currently, swaps with the following characteristics are ex-
cluded, for the most part, from the CFTC's jurisdiction: (1) the
parties to the swap are "eligible swap participants;"'203 (2) the swap is
not part of a fungible class of agreements standardized as to their ma-
terial economic terms; (3) counterparty creditworthiness was a mate-
rial consideration of the parties in entering into the swap agreement;
and (4) the swap was not entered into and is not traded on, or
through, an exchange market ("CFTC Swap Exemption"). 4 The ma-
jority of swap agreements possess these characteristics and thus will
be exempt from most CFTC regulation.25
For example, the Moneylender/Producestuff interest rate swap
would likely be exempt under the CFTC Swap Exemption. Both par-
ties to the Swap Agreement are eligible swap participants. Money-
195. For an explanation of marking to market, see supra note 118.
196. See Gilberg, supra note 166, at 1647-48.
197. See id. at 1648.
198. See Hull, supra note 2, at 8-9.
199. Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (1989).
200. Id.
201. Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)-(d) (1994)).
202. 17 C.F.R. § 35 (1995).
203. The following are considered "eligible swap participants" for purposes of ex-
emption of swaps from CFTC regulation: (1) a bank or trust company;, (2) a savings
association or credit union; (3) an insurance company;, (4) an investment company
subject to regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940; (5) a commodity
pool subject to regulation under the CEA; (6) a corporation, partnership, proprietor-
ship, organization, trust or other entity meeting certain financial requirements; (7) an
employee benefit plan subject to ERISA; (8) a governmental entity or political subdi-
vision thereof; (9) a broker-dealer subject to regulation under the 1934 Act; (10) a
futures commission merchant, floor broker, or floor trader subject to regulation under
the CEA; or (11) any natural person with total assets exceeding at least S10,000,000.
17 C.F.R. § 35.1(b)(2) (1995).
204. 17 C.F.R. § 35.2 (1995). Certain sections of the CEA, including the antifraud
provisions, apply even to swaps exempted under § 35. See id.
205. See Gilberg, supra note 166, at 1647-48.
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lender is a bank, °6 and Producestuff is a corporation with a net worth
in excess of $1,000,000 that is entering into the swap agreement to
manage the risk associated with its bond payments and distribution
contracts. 20 7 Moreover, the interest rate swap contains privately-ne-
gotiated terms and thus is not part of a standardized fungible class of
agreements. The Swap Agreement embodying the terms of the swap
expressly states that counterparty creditworthiness was a material
consideration for each party in entering into the swap transaction. Fi-
nally, Moneylender designed the swap for, and offered it exclusively
to, Producestuff. The swap was not entered into on, or traded on or
through, an organized exchange. Thus, the Moneylender/Producestuff
swap transaction appears not to fall under the jurisdiction of the
CFTC.
D. Federal Regulation of Swaps Recommended by Banks
A bank recommending a swap transaction will be subject to over-
sight by one or more federal banking regulators. 08 Nationally
chartered banks are regulated by the OCC. °9 Federal Reserve mem-
ber banks with state charters are overseen by the Federal Reserve l0
and state banking authorities.2 1 A state chartered bank that is not a
member of the Federal Reserve, but that is insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), is regulated by the FDIC
and state banking authorities." 2 Thrifts are subject to oversight by
the Office of Thrift Supervision, and by the OCC or state banking
authorities, depending on whether the thrift is nationally or state
chartered.213 The majority of banks that regularly enter into swap
transactions are regulated either by the OCC, as is Moneylender, or
by the Federal Reserve and state banking authorities. 14
In October 1993, the OCC issued a banking circular ("BC-277")
that provided guidance to national banks regarding risk management
of derivatives activities.215 BC-277 states that a bank proposing a de-
206. See 17 C.F.R. § 35.1(b)(2)(i) (1995) (including banks within the definition of
"eligible swap participant").
207. See 17 C.F.R. § 35.1(b)(2)(vi) (1995) (including certain large corporations
within the definition of "eligible swap participant").
208. See General Accounting Office, Financial Derivatives 69 (1994) [hereinafter
GAO Report].
209. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1994).
210. 12 U.S.C. § 330 (1994).
211. GAO Report, supra note 208, at 69.
212. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1994).
213. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1994).
214. See GAO Report, supra note 208, at 70.
215. Risk Management of Financial Derivatives, BC-277, Oct. 27, 1993, available in
1993 WL 640326 (OCC) [hereinafter BC-277]. BC-277 defines derivatives as "finan-
cial instruments which derive their value from the performance of assets, interest or
currency exchange rates, or indexes" and explicitly includes swaps within this defini-
tion. Id. at *2.
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rivatives transaction to a customer should (1) be able to identify
whether the transaction is consistent with the customer's policies and
procedures as they are known to the bank, (2) be able to effectively
analyze the impact of the proposed transaction on the financial condi-
tion of the customer, and (3) understand the applicability of derivative
instruments to the risks the customer is attempting to manage.2 16 The
OCC, however, does not prohibit banks from entering into a deriva-
tives transaction that it feels is inappropriate for the customer 217 In-
stead, BC-277 merely requires a bank to document the analysis and
information provided to the customer if the customer proceeds with
an inappropriate transaction.218
The investment community originally viewed BC-277 as including a
suitability rule applicable to swap transactions recommended by
banks.21 Subsequent to the issuance of BC-277, however, the OCC
issued a bulletin specifically stating that BC-277 does not contain a
suitability rule.2 ° In this bulletin, the OCC did acknowledge that a
bank recommending a derivative transaction should understand the
risk the customer is trying to manage or assume in entering into the
transaction.2 1 Additionally, the bulletin indicated that a bank should
ensure that the customer understands the nature and risk of the deriv-
atives transaction, and should explain how the transaction will achieve
the customer's objectives.2' Nonetheless, the OCC stated explicitly
that BC-277 does not impose a suitability rule on banks recom-
mending derivatives transactions.223
Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNIFORM REGULATION OF THE
SUITABILITY OF DERIVATIVES TRANSACTIONS
There currently exists no comprehensive regulatory framework that
protects customers such as Middlemanager, Leisure, and Producestuff
from recommendations of unsuitable derivatives transactions. The
NASD and exchange suitability rules provide guidelines for address-
ing the suitability of options transactions and allow for disciplinary
proceedings against registered representatives that violate these
rules?.2 The NASD and exchange rules, however, do not provide a
private cause of action for customers injured by unsuitable recommen-
216. BC-277, supra note 215, at *7.
217. Id.
218. ld.
219. Banks Must Assess the Appropriateness of Derivatives for Clients, OCC Says,
26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 698 (May 13, 1994).
220. OCC Bulletin, May 10, 1994, available in 1994 WL 194290 (OCC), at *11-12.
221. Id. at *14.
222. Id.
223. Id. at *11-12; see Bank Agencies Drafting Suitability Rule Covering Bank Sales
of Structured Notes, 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 772 (Nov. 28, 1994).
224. See supra notes 73-102 and accompanying text.
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dations. 225 Liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 based solely
on unsuitable recommendations is difficult to establish. 6 The CFTC,
which has exclusive jurisdiction over transactions in futures contracts,
does not currently have a suitability rule. 7 Swaps do not fall under
the jurisdiction of either the federal securities laws or the CFTC.18
Swap transactions recommended by banks are subject to oversight by
federal banking regulators.' 9 These regulators, however, do not
impose a legal duty on banks to recommend only suitable
transactions. 23 o
In order to adequately protect the public from recommendations of
unsuitable derivatives transactions, a comprehensive derivatives suita-
bility rule should be established. This part discusses the viability of
imposing such a rule. Section A examines the policy considerations
surrounding the promulgation of a derivatives suitability rule. Section
B discusses bills pending in Congress that contain provisions allowing
for the enactment of a comprehensive derivatives suitability rule. Sec-
tion C proposes a model derivatives suitability rule and section D ap-
plies this model rule to the situations of Middlemanager, Leisure, and
Producestuff.
A. Policy Considerations
Some commentators contend that imposing a legal duty on invest-
ment professionals to recommend only suitable derivatives transac-
tions is unnecessary and unwise. These commentators advance
several arguments in support of their position. First, they note that
suitability is often difficult to determine2 31 The information required
to make such-a determination may be burdensome to obtain and ver-
ify, and may rapidly become outdated.232 Additionally, commentators
arguing against a derivatives suitability rule contend that sufficient
customer protection, in the form of disclosure and antichurning rules,
and the common law doctrine of fiduciary duty, is already in place. 33
Finally, according to these commentators, suitability requirements en-
courage unnecessary litigation234 and hurt the United States' competi-
tiveness in the international derivatives market . 35
These arguments, however, are flawed and outweighed by argu-
ments supporting the adoption of suitability standards for derivatives
225. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1980).
226. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 120-47 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 158-207 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 215-23 and accompanying text.
231. Greenough, supra note 21, at 1006.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1007.
234. Ma at 1007-08.
235. Blackman, supra note 30, at 5.
SUITABILITY AND DERIVATIVES
transactions. First, investment professionals governed by the NASD
and exchange suitability rules currently assess the suitability of op-
tions transactions, indicating that determining suitability is not an in-
surmountable task. Additionally, disclosure and antichurning rules do
not adequately protect customers. Disclosure rules are no match for
aggressive selling on the part of unscrupulous investment profession-
als236 and churning is simply one of many categories of unsuitable
practices. Moreover, investment professionals should be responsible
for assessing suitability because of their special relationship with the
investing public.3 7 The public is encouraged to, and does, rely on the
superior skill of the investment community in its financial transac-
tions.38 This factor is especially important in light of the complicated
and risky nature of derivative instruments 39 Finally, adoption of a
comprehensive derivatives suitability rule may actually assist invest-
ment professionals. Compliance with an established suitability rule
could serve as a defense to a customer's claim of unsuitable recom-
mendations.' Additionally, a suitability rule would put investment
professionals on notice of what governing agencies expect of them,
thus allowing for the adoption of procedures to guard against poten-
tial liability.241
B. Pending Legislation
At the time of publication of this Note, two bills are pending in the
104th Congress that would allow for the development and implemen-
tation of a comprehensive derivatives suitability rule.242 First, on Jan-
uary 4, 1995, Jim Leach (R-Iowa) introduced the Risk Management
Improvement and Derivatives Oversight Act of 1995 ("Derivatives
Oversight Act") in the House of Representatives. 3 The purpose of
this pending legislation is to establish principles and standards for the
supervision by federal regulators of financial institutions engaged in
derivatives activities 4 The Derivatives Oversight Act would create
a Federal Derivatives Commission ("FDC") consisting of (1) the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
(2) the Comptroller of the Currency, (3) the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the FDIC, (4) the Director of the Office of Thrift Super-
236. Van Smith, supra note 142, at 625.
237. Fishman, supra note 21, at 240.
238. Id.
239. Van Smith, supra note 142, at 620.
240. Id. at 629-30.
241. Id.
242. Members of the securities industry have also addressed the regulation of
derivatives. In March 1995, the Derivatives Policy Group, a committee of securities
industry executives, issued a report containing guidelines for derivatives trading.
Bencivenga, supra note 17, at 5; Richards & Greenspan, supra note 17, at 4. This
report, however, did not directly refer to suitability. Id.




vision, (5) the Chairman of the SEC, (6) the Chairman of the CFTC,
and (7) the Secretary of the Treasury.245 Additionally, the Derivatives
Oversight Act mandates that the FDC establish principles and stan-
dards regarding, among other issues, suitability.246 The regulatory
agencies comprising the FDC would be required, under the Deriva-
tives Oversight Act, to issue and enforce regulations necessary to im-
plement these standards. 47 Finally, the Derivatives Oversight Act
provides that the derivatives activities of any financial institution not
subject to supervision by either a federal banking agency or the CFTC
shall be supervised by the SEC.248
Also on January 4, 1995, Henry Gonzalez (D-Texas) introduced the
Derivatives Safety and Soundness Supervision Act of 1995 ("Deriva-
tives Supervision Act") in the House of Representatives.24 9 This bill,
like the Derivatives Oversight Act, seeks to increase federal agency
oversight of derivatives activities.25 0 The Derivatives Supervision Act
does not provide for the establishment of an interagency derivatives
commission. It does, however, mandate that federal regulatory agen-
cies, in consultation with each other, establish substantially similar
standards regarding, among other issues, the suitability of derivatives
transactions.251
C. A Model Uniform Derivatives Suitability Rule
The Derivatives Oversight Act and the Derivatives Supervision Act
both provide for comprehensive regulation of derivatives trading.
Additionally, the pending legislation requires federal regulatory agen-
cies to establish suitability standards governing derivatives transac-
tions. Parts I and II of this Note demonstrate that the current
suitability rules do not adequately protect the public from unsuitable
investments in derivatives. Thus, Congress should enact either the
Derivatives Oversight Act or the Derivatives Supervision Act and the
appropriate regulatory bodies should promulgate a derivatives suita-
bility rule. This section proposes a model derivatives suitability rule
that addresses issues discussed earlier in this Note. 252 Additionally,
this section highlights the strengths of the proposed model rule.
245. Id. § 103(a).
246. Id. § 104(a)(1)(D).
247. Id. § 104(a)(2).
248. H.R. 20, § 104(a)(4), 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
249. H.R. 31, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
250. Id. § 101.
251. Id. § 101(a). The federal regulatory agencies charged with establishing stan-
dards under the Derivatives Supervision Act include the agencies that make up the
FDC under the Derivatives Oversight Act. See id. § 2(3).




1. A Model Derivatives Suitability Rule
RULE 101. SUITABILITY OF DERIVATIVES
TRANSACTIONS
Section A. Definitions
(1) Customer: For purposes of this rule, a "customer" is the
party entering into the derivatives transaction with the dealer.
(2) Customer Representative: For purposes of this rule, a
"customer representative" is the natural person to whom a rec-
ommendation is directed. The "customer" and "customer rep-
resentative" can be the same person.
(3) Derivative: For purposes of this rule, the term "derivative"
includes any financial instrument the value of which is derived
from the value of an underlying instrument. "Derivative" in-
cludes, but is not limited to, options, futures, and swaps.
(4) Recommendation: For purposes of this rule, the term "rec-
ommendation" means any recommendation to buy, sell, or
maintain any derivatives position, or the recommendation of
any specific derivatives investment strategy. "Recommenda-
tion" does not include the execution of an unsolicited
transaction.
Section B. Responsibilities of Investment Professionals
(1) Prior to recommending to a customer representative any
transaction involving a derivative, an investment professional
must:
(a) determine that such recommendation is suitable for the
customer in light of the customer's financial situation and
objectives;
(b) ensure that the customer representative fully under-
stands the nature and risks of the recommended transac-
tion; and
(c) ensure that the customer can withstand the potential
loss inherent in the recommended transaction.
Section C. Information Necessary to Determine Suitability
(1) An investment professional has an affirmative duty to ob-
tain information regarding a customer's financial situation and
objectives prior to recommending a derivatives transaction.
(2) The information that must be obtained includes, but is not
limited to, the following:
(a) the customer's net worth;
(b) the customer's income or cash flow,
(c) the customer's current liabilities;
(d) the customer's financial responsibilities;
(d) the customer's financial objectives; and
(e) the customer's and customer representative's prior in-
vestment experience.
(3) Information regarding a customer's financial situation and
objectives must be obtained throughout the investment profes-
sional's relationship with the customer.




Section D. Consequences of Violation
An investment professional found guilty of violating this rule
shall:
(1) be subject to disciplinary sanctions; and
(2) be liable to the injured customer for actual damages in
a court of law or arbitration proceeding.
2. Benefits of Rule 101
Rule 101 provides a comprehensive framework governing the suita-
bility of recommended derivatives transactions. Section A of the rule
defines "derivative" to include all derivative instruments within its
scope. This broad definition avoids the problem of determining what
regulations govern swap transactions, and other similar new types of
investments, by including them in the definition of derivative. Section
A also distinguishes between a "customer" and a "customer represen-
tative." This distinction requires investment professionals to take
steps to ensure that the individual to whom the derivatives transaction
is proposed fully understands the nature and risks of the transaction.
Finally, in order to avoid imposing unduly burdensome duties on in-
vestment professionals, Section A excludes all unsolicited transactions
from the definition of "recommendation."
Section B of Rule 101 clearly outlines an investment professional's
obligations in recommending a derivatives transaction-(1) to deter-
mine the suitability of the transaction, (2) to ensure that the customer
representative fully understands the transaction, and (3) to ensure
that the customer can withstand the potential losses inherent in the
transaction. Section C imposes an affirmative duty on investment pro-
fessionals to obtain from customers the information necessary to sat-
isfy the requirements of Section B. Additionally, Section C provides a
nonexclusive list of required information that an investment profes-
sional must obtain from the customer. Section C also mandates that
the investment professional gather such information on an ongoing
basis and record it in writing.
Section D subjects investment professionals in violation of Rule 101
to disciplinary sanctions. Additionally, Section D provides a private
cause of action to customers injured by the recommendation of un-
suitable derivatives transactions.
D. Application of Rule 101 to the Hypothetical Transactions
Parts I and II illustrated that Middlemanager, Leisure, and
Producestuff are not adequately protected under the current suitabil-
ity rules. Rule 101, however, provides protection against unsuitable
derivatives similar to those investments recommended by Richbroker,
Futuresdealer, and Moneylender. The following subsections apply
Rule 101 to the situations of the three hypothetical clients.
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1. The Richbroker/Middlemanager Options Transaction
The suitability obligations placed on investment professionals under
Rule 101 are similar to those imposed by the NASD and SRO rules
that currently govern options transactions3 53 Application of the
NASD and SRO rules to the Richbroker/Middlemanager transaction
demonstrates that Richbroker would be subject to disciplinary actions
under these rules.254 Thus, Richbroker's actions also violate Rule 101.
Rule 101, however, provides Middlemanager with a remedy for his
injuries suffered as a result of Richbroker's unsuitable
recommendation.
2. The Futuresdealer/Leisure Futures Transaction
Leisure would also have a cause of action against Futuresdealer and
Commodityco under Rule 101. First, Futuresdealer failed to satisfy
Section C of the rule because she did not obtain from Leisure the
information necessary to determine suitability. The only knowledge
of Leisure's finances that Futuresdealer had in making the recommen-
dation was that Leisure had $125,000 of risk capital to invest. Fu-
turesdealer knew nothing further about Leisure's financial situation
and objectives.
Additionally, the risky futures contracts recommended to Leisure
by Futuresdealer were definitely not suitable for a retired person on a
fixed income. Though Leisure was interested in growth investments,
he did not necessarily desire to speculate with gold futures. More-
over, Futuresdealer did not take steps to ensure that Leisure under-
stood fully the nature and risks of futures trading. The risk disclosure
statement provided by Leisure did not satisfy Futuresdealer's obliga-
tions under Rule 101. Futuresdealer could attempt to argue that Lei-
sure had the requisite knowledge because he was well-educated and
had purchased futures on two prior occasions. These factors, how-
ever, did not mean that Leisure fully understood the futures transac-
tion recommended by Futuresdealer.
Finally, Futuresdealer did not ensure that Leisure could withstand
the potential loss inherent in gold futures. All Futuresdealer knew
was that Leisure had $125,000 of risk capital. Leisure deposited
$100,000 of these funds to satisfy the initial margin requirement. If
the position moved against him, as it did, Futuresdealer had no assur-
ance that Leisure could meet margin calls. Thus, it appears that Fu-
turesdealer violated Rule 101, subjecting herself and Commodityco to
sanctions and civil liability.
253. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
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3. The Moneylender/Producestuff Swap Transaction
Moneylender's recommendation of the interest rate swap to
Producestuff is also a violation of Rule 101. While Moneylender's
long-term banking relationship with Producestuff indicates that Mon-
eylender had the necessary information to determine suitability, the
recommended swap was not a suitable transaction in light of
Producestuff's financial situation and objectives. First, Financeman
expressly indicated that it wanted to make payments paralleling the
commercial paper rate. The complex formula upon which Produces-
tuff's swap payments were based did not mirror the commercial paper
rate. Financeman also stated that Producestuff desired to make pay-
ments at relatively frequent intervals. Payments under the swap
agreement were to be made only twice a year. Moreover, while the
distributorship contracts necessitating the swap could be renegotiated
every two years, the swap had a term of fifteen years.
Additionally, while Moneylender did define swaps for the
Producestuff finance department, the bank took no further steps to
explain the nature of the specific interest rate swap recommended.
This explanation was especially important considering that only
Financeman had any extensive knowledge of swaps. Thus, Money-
lender's recommendation was unsuitable, subjecting the bank to sanc-
tions and providing Producestuff with a cause of action under Rule
101.
CONCLUSION
Derivatives provide benefits to both investors and dealers. Numer-
ous companies currently utilize derivative instruments to hedge the
risks of their business operations and to increase investment earnings.
Additionally, derivatives activity has increased the profits of broker-
dealers and banks. These positive effects, however, are accompanied
by a downside. Both consumers and dealers of derivatives recently
experienced significant losses from derivatives activity.
Derivatives, and the news surrounding their use, bring to the fore-
front two significant issues. First, derivatives demonstrate the frag-
mentation of the law governing the investment community. Entirely
separate regulatory frameworks govern the two most common types
of derivatives-options and futures. Furthermore, courts are unde-
cided regarding the rules that should govern swap transactions. Cer-
tain features, however, are common to all types of derivative products.
Thus, the various financial regulatory agencies should cooperate in the
oversight of the derivatives market under a consistent set of rules.
Additionally, derivatives show that the complexity of new financial
products can invalidate current rules. Derivatives are used mostly by
large institutional investors that are considered sophisticated custom-
ers. Investment professionals are generally not required to determine
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the suitability of products recommended to sophisticated investors.
Thus, under the current rules, derivatives dealers often do not have to
ascertain whether the derivatives transactions they recommend are
appropriate for their customers. The complicated nature of derivative
instruments and the extreme risk underlying their use, however, make
some derivatives transactions unsuitable even for sophisticated inves-
tors. The duty to determine suitability should be placed on invest-
ment professionals who understand complex derivatives transactions.
The Derivatives Oversight Act and the Derivatives Supervision Act
provide for cooperative regulation of the derivatives market. Rule
101, as proposed in this Note, places necessary obligations on deriva-
tives dealers to determine the suitability of transactions for their cus-
tomers. To prevent the problems created by derivatives from
overcoming the usefulness of these new financial products, Congress
should enact the pending derivatives legislation and the appropriate
agencies should then promulgate a rule similar to Rule 101.

